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ABSTRACT 
This article takes as its central theme the idea that in developing the 
Australian counter-terrorism response of the ASIO questioning and detention 
regime,1 distinctive, identifiable characteristics have emerged in the 
Government approach to international and comparative examples necessarily 
referred and responded to as justifying that development. These characteristics 
may be conveniently described as the Australianisation of international and 
comparative counter-terrorism examples, or selective internationalism, and 
these features are variously manifested in the areas examined in this article.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
he article commences with an outline of the essentials of this 
Australianised selective internationalism approach. There follows a 
summary of the detention and questioning warrant provisions under 
Division 3, Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), highlighting the 
distinctive characteristic of the legislation, the potential detention of innocent 
persons thought to be of intelligence value. That unique feature of the Australian 
legislation is both reflective of and critical to understanding and rationalising the 
selective internationalism in the Australianisation process. 
A contextual overview follows of key factors facilitating this selectivity. The 
absence of a bill of rights differentiating limits and approaches from other 
comparable common law democracies, along with illustrative examples from the 
                                                 
*  Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania. The author gave an invited witness 
submission, based on written submissions, to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of 
Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 in 
Canberra in May 2005. The author would like to thank Dr Andrew Lynch, Director of 
the Terrorism and the Law Project at the Gilbert + Tobin Centre at the Faculty of 
Law, University of NSW and the anonymous Adelaide Law Review referee, for their 
comments on a draft of this article. 
1  As found in Division 3, Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979 (Cth). In contrast, the Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 (Cth) implements a 
regime of preventative detention and does not implement an intelligence gathering 
questioning and detention regime. This is confirmed by the general prohibition on 
questioning by police and ASIO in Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s.105.42, inserted 
by the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 4.  
T 
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United Kingdom and Canada, demonstrates the legal and political constraints 
invoked in counter-terrorism legislation by bills of rights. The material of 
Australian responses to the United Nations human rights system and the Australian 
government‘s preferred model of human rights are included to facilitate 
understanding of the context in which the distinctively Australian intelligence 
gathering mechanism has evolved.  
Following this survey of the context and factors facilitating selective 
internationalism, consideration is made of some key features and manifestations of 
selective internationalism in developing a counter-terrorism questioning and 
detention regime, thereby providing insights into this Australianisation process. 
This material is organised and developed through a series of detailed themes, 
displaying the breadth and versatility of the Australianised selective 
internationalism application: acknowledging overseas legislation, differentiating the 
purposes of Australian and overseas legislation, claimed conformity of Australian 
legislation with international comparative examples, claimed superiority of 
Australian legislation over the legislation of other jurisdictions, asserted failings in 
the overseas jurisdictions in the claimed superiority of the Australian legislation, 
advocacy of French and other systems of extended detention, inadequate 
exemptions for legal advice in association offences for international redress, the 
role of a sunset clause in periodic review of the powers, and asserted compliance 
with international human rights obligations and implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 1373. 
These examples demonstrate how the development of ASIO questioning and 
detention powers has assumed a unique format, through interacting and engaging 
with international examples and approaches to create executive-orientated 
legislative objectives and consequences. Such a growing concentration under the 
mantle of counter-terrorism is and will produce further transformations in 
assumptions of liberty, the precedence of intelligence gathering and in the 
characteristics and manifestations of Australian democracy.  
II.  EXPLAINING SELECTIVE INTERNATIONALISM IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
The development of the ASIO intelligence gathering detention and questioning 
powers has followed a pattern readily adopting and extending enabling measures 
whilst distinguishing, resisting or rejecting measures promoting greater 
accountability and the protection of human rights. In understanding that 
development, selectivity, re-interpretation and re-conception of international and 
comparative examples are prominent features. This involves a selective and 
occasionally inconsistent usage of international and comparative examples, to 
extend the reach and strength of executive power whilst declining from those same 
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international and comparative examples restraints upon power which reflect human 
rights principles. This process may be described as the Australianisation of 
international and comparative counter-terrorism examples – and more conveniently 
labelled as selective internationalism. It has emerged as a recognisable, if loose, 
modus operandi or methodology to advance and justify the relevant powers. It is 
adaptable and flexible towards that particular end.  
Reference to international and comparative examples is used to defend against and 
deny claims that the Australian legislation forms an excessive response when 
compared to counter-terrorism legislation in common law democracies. That 
defence and denial similarly ignores the influence of bills of rights in those common 
law jurisdictions upon the drafting of counter-terrorism legislation and the 
legislative environment so created. It also diverts attention from both an 
incremental concentration of executive power, a greatly enlarged discretion in how 
such executive power is to be exercised, and the increasing fragility of democratic 
assumptions and expectations occasioned by novel counter-terrorism laws such as 
the detention and questioning powers.  
This Australianisation process is distinctive — both in its taking exception to 
substantive restraints upon executive power and in providing an exceptional model 
of detention and questioning distinctive from other common law democracies. This 
Australianisation is more readily comprehended by first examining the legal 
influences and context contributing to its emergence, and subsequently considering 
the peculiarities of several illustrative examples where selective internationalism 
has emerged. 
The starting point for an examination of the above considerations is to outline the 
distinctive features of the Australian questioning and detention regime under 
Division 3,  Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). 
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III.  DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEGISLATION: AN OUTLINE OF 
DIVISION 3, PART III OF THE ASIO ACT 1979 (CTH) 
The distinctive characteristic of this legislation,2 in contrast to comparable common 
law jurisdictions, is that it provides for the detention of non-suspect citizens who 
may simply be thought to have information about terrorism offences,3 such 
detention conditional upon certain grounds under a warrant process.4 In the case of 
a detention and questioning warrant issued under the legislation, it must authorise 
the named person to be taken into custody immediately by a police officer, brought 
before a prescribed authority immediately for questioning under the warrant and 
detained under arrangements made by a police officer for the questioning period.5 
The regime provides for a maximum of 24 hours of questioning in three eight hour 
blocks of questioning in the presence of the prescribed authority. Following each 
cumulation of eight hours of questioning, the prescribed authority, on application of 
                                                 
2  A summary of the questioning and detention provisions under div 3 of pt III of the 
ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) is provided in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD, ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers-Review of the operation, 
effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (2005), 2–3 (hereafter Joint Parliamentary 
Committee 2005 Report). See also the summary of the provisions in Greg Carne, 
“‘Brigitte And The French Connection: Security Carte Blanche Or A La Carte”?’ 
(2004) 9 Deakin Law Review 573, 582–91; Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism’ 
Laws: A Threat To Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights‘ 
(2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 666, 677–80; Michael Head, ‘Another 
Threat to Democratic Rights ASIO detentions cloaked in secrecy‘ (2003) 29 
Alternative Law Journal 127, 128–9; and Christopher Michaelsen‘‘‘Antiterrorism 
Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat“ (2005) 28 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 321, 325–8. 
3  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(4)(a) ‘that there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
issuing the warrant to be requested will substantially assist the collection of 
intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence‘ and (b) ‘that relying 
on other methods of collecting that intelligence would be ineffective‘. It should be 
noted that “amendments to the Criminal Code 1995 have increased the number and 
type of ‘terrorism offences’ (including ancillary offences), which have effectively 
extended ASIO’s questioning and detention powers beyond that conceived in the 
original legislation introduced in 2002“: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 
33.  
4  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(4)(d) ‘that there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
if the person is not immediately taken into custody and detained, the person (i) may 
alert a person involved in a terrorism offence that the offence is being investigated; or 
(ii) may not appear before the prescribed authority; or (iii) may destroy, damage or 
alter a record or thing the person may be requested in accordance with the warrant to 
produce’. 
5  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G (3). 
(2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 5 
a person exercising authority under the warrant, may only permit the questioning to 
continue if satisfied of certain conditions.6 Such questioning may take place during 
a detention of up to 168 hours,7 with the capacity to obtain second and subsequent 
detention warrants.8 
Detention can fairly be described as incommunicado as the detainee, not suspected 
of any terrorism offence but thought to have relevant information, may disappear 
from the community for one week — the detainee has no enforceable right to notify 
family members or employers of one’s whereabouts,9 there being only discretionary 
communication10 which is subject to a range of contingencies.11 This nature of the 
detention is subsequently reinforced by offences prohibiting information 
disclosure12 before the expiry of a warrant13 and in the two years after the expiry of 
a warrant.14 
                                                 
6  That ‘(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that permitting the continuation 
will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a 
terrorism offence, and (b) persons exercising authority under the warrant conducted 
the questioning of the person properly and without delay in the period mentioned in 
that subsection’: ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34R(4)(a) and (b). 
7  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 S. 
8  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G(1)(b), s 34G(2)(a),(b)(i) and (ii). On the issue of potential 
ease of obtaining a second or subsequent warrant, following the rejection of the Law 
Council of Australia’s proposals, see Duncan Kerr, ‘Australia’s Legislative Response 
To Terrorism: Strengthening arbitrary executive power at the expense of the rule of 
law‘ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 131, 132–3. 
9  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34K (10). 
10  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34K (11). 
11  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G(3)(b), s 34G (5), ss 34K(1)(d) and 34K (2). 
12  Commentators have highlighted the particularly adverse impact on democratic 
accountability and control over the operation of the questioning and detention powers 
through media reporting and public debate with the introduction of these measures in 
2003 by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth): see Joo-Cheong Tham and 
Jude McCulloch, ‘Secrecy, Silence and State Terror‘ (2005) 77 Arena (June–July) 
46; Michael Head, ‘Another Threat To Democratic Right ASIO detentions cloaked in 
secrecy‘ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 127, 127–8; Michael Head, ‘ASIO, 
Secrecy and Lack of Accountability‘ (2005) 11 E-Law Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law, 1 [16]–[20]. The seriousness of consequences of these 
amendments for the functioning of Australian democracy led the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee to recommend a reduction in penalty for unauthorised disclosure of 
operational information, that the term “operational information” be more closely 
defined, that consideration be given to amendments so that secrecy provisions 
affecting the questioning only warrants be revised to allow for disclosure of the 
existence of the warrant and that consideration be given to shifting the determination 
of the need for greater non-disclosure to the prescribed authority: Joint Parliamentary 
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The defining and distinguishing feature of the Australian questioning and detention 
provisions is that other comparable Anglophone democracies such as the United 
Kingdom,15 Canada,16 New Zealand17 and the United States18 have not legislated for 
incommunicado detention of non-suspect citizens who may simply be thought to 
have information about terrorism offences.19 
This significant difference demands attention and deserves an explanation for 
several reasons. First is the contradiction or inconsistency in rejecting the legislated 
limits of international comparative examples in similar jurisdictions in developing 
an intelligence gathering mechanism for non suspects as part of the international 
war on terrorism. Second is that the breaching of the threshold enabling detention of 
non suspect persons signals a significant transformation in the relationship between 
the citizen and the state,20 creating adverse long term implications for the nature of 
                                                                                                                             
Committee 2005 Report, 87 (Recommendation 15), 89 (Recommendation 16) and 94 
(Recommendation 17).  
13  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34ZS(1). 
14  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34ZS(2). 
15  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 (UK) and the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK). 
16  Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (Canada) Act No 41 of 2001. 
17  Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (NZ). 
18  USA Patriot Act 2001 Public Law No 107–56. 
19  The reach of the div 3 of pt III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) to non-suspects means 
these intelligence gathering powers exceed what is available in comparable common 
law countries: see George Williams, ‘Australian Values and the War Against 
Terrorism‘ (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 191, 197; George 
Williams, ‘One Year On: Australia’s legal response to September 11‘ (2002) 27 
Alternative Law Journal 212, 215; Michaelsen, ‘‘above n 2, 321, 326, 329; Carne, 
above n2, 604‘‘‘. 
20  In the sense that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is no longer a threshold 
requirement conditioning detention or other invasive response — a further recent 
example is the capacity to intercept “B-Party” communications, namely persons who 
unconsciously or inadvertently have communicated with someone suspected of a 
crime or being a threat to national security, under the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). See George Williams, ‘New law frees spy 
agencies to snoop on the innocent‘ The Age (Melbourne), 3 April 2006, ?? and 
Andrew Lynch, ‘Hasty law-making diminishes public respect for the law itself‘ 
Canberra Times (Canberra) 3 April 2006 ??. Similarly, the predictive and preparatory 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” threshold for the application and the making of a 
preventative detention order in relation to a terrorist act are considerably lower than 
the reasonable grounds for belief providing for arrest for a terrorism offence: see 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 105.4(4) inserted by Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2005 (Cth), sch 4, contrasted with s 3W of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
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values, practices and institutions of Australian democracy,21 the very subject matter 
of primary defence against international terrorism. A further reason is that in 
developing and applying this Australianised approach, the limits upon an 
incremental conferral of further powers and erosion of rights, following 
Government control of the Senate after July 1, 2005, are merely constitutional, 
rather than political, in nature.22 
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE FACTORS FACILITATING SELECTIVE INTERNATIONALISM 
IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
A.  Setting outer limits and informing a political culture: the absence of a bill of 
rights 
It is no coincidence that the presence of a bill of rights in the United Kingdom, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States has created different operating 
parameters and political constraints upon legislative responses to terrorism. In those 
jurisdictions legislative drafters and parliaments must address, reconcile and 
integrate issues of national security and civil and political rights in counter-
terrorism measures within a human rights framework prescribed by a central 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional document. The most concrete effect from a bill 
of rights in relation to counter-terrorism legislative responses is restraining extreme, 
spontaneous and serial legislative responses and in promoting accountability and 
justification, particularly when departure is contemplated from international human 
rights standards.23 
                                                 
21  For example, serious public accountability issues when the mandate of a secretive 
intelligence gathering organisation is extended to incorporate police like powers of 
detention and interrogation: see Williams, ‘One Year On’ ’‘above n 19 212, 214–15; 
Jenny Hocking, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia’s 
New Security Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control‘ (2003) 49 Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 355, esp 356–8. For broader issues of maintaining 
liberal democratic characteristics of the Australian polity when subject to counter-
terrorism law reform, see generally Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-
Terrorism and The Threat to Democracy (2004). 
22  Indeed, the adopted process now appears, reflecting enactment of the sedition offence 
provisions in sch 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) and the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) to pass counter-
terrorism legislation rapidly, with a concessional and discretionary view to 
amendments later: see Andrew Lynch, ‘Hasty law-making diminishes public respect 
for the law itself‘ Canberra Times (Canberra) 3 April 2006. 
23  For further discussion on the role of a bill of rights in influencing counter-terrorism 
laws, see George Williams, ‘National Security, terrorism and Bills of Rights‘ (2003) 
8 Australian Journal of Human Rights 263, 269–70; Angela Ward, ‘Checks 
Balances‘ (2005) 68 Precedent 12, 14; Jo Kummow ‘Countering Terrorism and 
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In the Australian context, similar points were highlighted in the submission of the 
ACT government to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
2005 Review of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation questioning and 
detention powers: 
The lack of a national Bill of Rights in Australia, means that the opportunity 
to test the compatibility of Division 3 against internationally accepted 
minimum human rights standards is seriously limited. 
In the Australian Capital Territory such important questions of legal policy 
must be developed in light of the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 (HRA) which 
reflects the human rights standards set by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The HRA imposes a discipline on the ACT 
Executive to adopt a rational and proportionate approach to limitations on 
fundamental civil and political rights. By contrast, it does not appear that the 
development of this Commonwealth legislation was informed by a proper 
analysis of the ICCPR. Australia has been a party to the Covenant for over 30 
years. In the absence of a national Bill of Rights, the international human 
rights standards of the ICCPR should play a central role as a benchmark of 
good law and policy. 
In my view, the legislation imposes excessive restrictions on fundamental 
rights to liberty, freedom of expression and access to legal advice and falls 
short of the ICCPR’s standards.24  
The lack of a bill of rights makes it far more difficult to elevate critical issues, such 
as the breaching of the non-suspect threshold to personal liberty by the questioning 
and detention powers, to a prominent place in public debate and review of the 
legislation by parliamentary committees. It also fosters a lack of legitimacy and 
insufficient legal literacy about human rights issues at the intersection with counter-
terrorism issues of a type that would effectively raise serious questions and 
attention concerning such legislation. Similarly, there is no judicially instigated 
reflection and review of laws by the executive and legislature following a finding of 
incompatibility with human rights principles that a bill of rights mechanism 
prompts. 
All of these factors are relevant in providing conditions conducive to this process of 
selective internationalisation, more so because the interpretation and articulation of 
                                                                                                                             
Protecting Human Rights‘ (2004) 78 (12) Law Institute Journal 66; Christopher 
Michaelsen, ‘International Human Rights on Trial — The United Kingdom’s and 
Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11‘ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 275. 
24  Submission of ACT Chief Minister Jon Stanhope to Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO Questioning and Detention Powers, 
Submission No 93 (12 April 2005). 
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a bill of rights itself draws upon comparative examples and international 
jurisprudence. Such selective internationalism is also enabled by a lack of expertise 
surrounding, and familiarity with, bills of rights — in other words, a relative 
ignorance of the interaction of bills of rights in comparable legal systems with 
counter terrorism laws. Such issues surrounding a bill of rights are further 
complicated and compounded when claims are made that the Australian questioning 
and detention regime is in accordance with, as well as influenced by, overseas 
models,25 with the influence of  bill of rights often unarticulated or ignored. 
For present purposes however, two examples from comparable overseas 
jurisdictions demonstrate the invocation of legal and political restraints on counter-
terrorism matters emerging from bills of rights, of a kind simply absent in Australia. 
B.  United Kingdom: House of Lords finding of incompatibility in A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department and subsequent political developments  
Debate in the United Kingdom concerning the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) 
(UK) was introduced after the House of Lords’ findings in A and others v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department26 about the indeterminate detention of foreign 
nationals under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK). The House 
of Lords found provisions of this legislation incompatible with the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK),27 on the basis of it being a disproportionate response,28 
                                                 
25  This aspect is the subject of separate analysis and discussion under later headings 
“Dealing with and responding to overseas legislation”, “Acknowledging overseas 
legislation”, “Differentiating the purposes of the Australian legislation and overseas 
legislation”, “Claiming conformity of Australian legislation with international 
comparative examples” and “Claiming superiority of the Australian model when 
asserting failings in overseas jurisdictions”. 
26  [2005] 2 WLR 87. For some observations on the House of Lords decision, see 
Michael Kirby, ‘National Security: Proportionality, Restraint and Commonsense‘ 
(Paper presented at the Australian Law Reform Commission National Security Law 
Conference, Federal Court of Australia, 12 March 2005). 
27  [2005] 2 WLR 87 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord 
Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Carswell. Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe dissented. 
28  Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1) ‘In time of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation the High Contracting Party may 
take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are 
not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law‘. See especially 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill [2005] 2 WLR 87, 106–15, Lord Hope of Craighead 
[2005] 2 WLR 87, 145, Lord Scott of Foscote [2005] 2 WLR 87, 151–52 and Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry [2005] 2 WLR 87, 156.  
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discriminatory against foreign nationals29 and infringing on the right to liberty and 
security of the person.30 
In response to the House of Lords findings, the United Kingdom government 
introduced a system of control orders, applicable to both nationals and non-
nationals. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) provides for control orders 
over persons for whom there are reasonable grounds for suspecting are or have been 
involved in terrorism related activity. Debate largely concerned the provision of a 
sunset clause upon the legislation.  
The House of Lords (in its legislative capacity) insisted four times on a sunset 
clause which would have provided for the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 to 
expire after eight months. The final version of the legislation allows for the 
expiration of the control order scheme at the end of 12 months from the day on 
which the Act is passed, subject to the Home Secretary being able to order by 
statutory instrument the continuation of the legislation for a period not exceeding a 
year.31 That order is in turn subject to an obligation upon the Home Secretary to 
consult with various persons32 and that a draft of the order has been placed before 
                                                 
29  Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights ‘The enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status‘. See especially Lord Bingham of Cornhill [2005] 2 WLR 87, 
115–27, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead [2005] 2 WLR 87, 131–2, Lord Hope of 
Craighead [2005] 2 WLR 87, 136, 145–7, Lord Scott of Foscote [2005] 2 WLR 87, 
152–3, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry [2005] 2 WLR 87, 156–7 and 163 and Baroness 
Hale of Richmond [2005] 2 WLR 177–8. 
30  Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1) ‘Everyone has the right 
to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful 
detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order 
to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent 
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after 
having done so… ‘. 
31  See s 13(2)(c ) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
32  Consultation involving the independent reviewer, the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner and the Director-General of the Security Services: see s 13(3)(a),(b) 
and (c) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
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Parliament and approved by resolution of each House,33 save by reasons of urgency 
where an alternative procedure applies.34 
The Home Secretary made concessions in the form of an independent reviewer to 
examine and report upon the effectiveness of the Prevention of Terrorism 
legislation — including, at that stage, that a new draft counter-terrorism bill be 
published and be subjected to full pre-legislative scrutiny, prior to its introduction in 
2006, informed by the report of the independent reviewer and lengthy parliamentary 
scrutiny.35 Following the July 2005 London bombings, the UK Government 
introduced the Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK) which included provision for yearly 
review of the legislation and a report to the Home Secretary and the laying of a 
copy of the report before Parliament.36 Given the changed circumstances, Lord 
Carlile, the independent reviewer, produced an October 2005 report on the 
Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK), with explanatory comments in the opening paragraphs of 
that report.37 The Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK) received Royal Assent as the Terrorism 
                                                 
33  See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) s 13(4). 
34  See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) s 13(6). Section 13(1) of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) provides that ‘Except so far as otherwise provided under 
this section, sections 1 to 9 (dealing with control orders) expire at the end of the 
period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed‘. Section 
13(2) allows the Home Secretary to make an order by statutory instrument enabling 
revival of sections 1 to 9 for a period not exceeding one year or for the sections to 
continue in force from the time they would otherwise expire for a period not 
exceeding one year. Section 13(4) requires that the making of a Section 13(2) order 
by the Home Secretary must be preceded by a draft being laid before Parliament and 
approved by a resolution of each House. 
35  Required by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 s 14(5), and the report “must 
contain” the reviewer’s opinion on ‘(a) the implications for the operation of this Act 
of any proposal made by the Secretary of State for the amendment of the law relating 
to terrorism’. 
36  Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK) s 36(1)–(6) Review of terrorism legislation. The Terrorism 
Bill 2005 (UK) was amended in Committee in the House of Lords on 20 December 
2005. 
37  See paras 2, 6 and 9 of the report: ‘Proposals by Her Majesty’s Government For 
Changes To The Laws Against Terrorism‘ Report by the Independent Reviewer Lord 
Carlile of Berriew QC: ‘In the normal course of events, in early 2006 I should have 
prepared a single report as independent reviewer. This would have been published in 
the same way as my other reports, on the Terrorism Act 2000 as amended….The 
London occurrences of July 2005 rightly and inevitably catalysed an earlier 
examination of potential additional legislation than had been envisaged at the time of 
the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The government indicated its 
intention to legislate very early in the resumed Parliamentary session commencing on 
10th October 2005. Consultation followed between the Home Secretary and the 
shadow spokespersons of the main Opposition parties…Given that new legislation 
has now been drafted and is intended to be in force before the routine publication of 
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Act 2006 (UK), enacting the procedure of yearly reviews by an independent 
reviewer.38 
C.  Canadian legislation, “Charter proofing“ and the challenge to the investigatory 
hearings mechanism in the Criminal Code 
Similarly, the positive influences of a bill of rights upon counter-terrorism 
legislation can be seen in the instance of the influence of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms over the provisions and constitutionality of the Canadian 
terrorism legislation, the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
The first of these influences is seen in the apparent attempt to “Charter proof” the 
legislation, that is, to draft the legislation with particular safeguards so as to 
maintain consistency with Charter principles. The Canadian Attorney-General, 
Irwin Cotler, preferred to describe the legislation as ‘pre-tested’ under the Charter: 
This does not mean that the legislation is ‘Charter-proof’ as much as it means 
that the legislation is Charter bound. In a word, the legislation is not immune 
from a Charter challenge, and any limitation on a Charter right will have to 
comport with the requirements of Section 1 and the proportionality test as 
developed by the courts … 39 
In turn, this proportionality test means that the legislation must pass both a 
necessity criterion — that the legislation exhibits a substantial and pressing 
objective — as well as a remedial criterion.40 In a variety of articles, the Canadian 
legislation has been consistently critiqued from the perspective of its asserted 
compliance with Charter rights and the legitimacy and consequences of Charter-
                                                                                                                             
my first report under section 14, it would have been absurd for me to wait until early 
next year to prepare my report on government proposals. Therefore, having received 
the draft Terrorism Bill 2005, I have decided to prepare this short additional report to 
be published prior to the Parliamentary debates on that Bill. I hope that it will assist 
in informing the debate’. 
38  Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) s 36 (1) to (6). 
39  Irwin Cotler ‘Thinking Outside the Box: Foundation Principles for a Counter-
Terrorism Law and Policy’in Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (eds) 
The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001), 120. 
40  Cotler, above n 39,  115. The remedial means part of the proportionality test requires 
that “there be a rational basis for the remedy tailored specifically to the objective; that 
the remedy intrude upon Charter rights as little as possible (the minimum impairment 
component of the proportionality test); and that the effect or cost of the legislation, 
particularly in its impact on our civil liberties, not outweigh its purposive and 
remedial character”: Cotler, above n 39,115. 
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proofing the legislation.41 The concept of Charter-proofing essentially means the 
routine drafting of legislation for deliberate, but basic conformity with the 
jurisprudentially expounded sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, regardless of other contrary and contesting public policy issues 
surrounding the legislation- such as its efficacy, desirability or necessity, or an 
Executive ability to use the concept to publicly rationalise and justify controversial 
measures infringing civil liberties. Whilst Charter-proofing’s frame of reference 
does encourage rights applications, such minimalism has also prompted some 
trenchant criticism.42    
Such criticism in the context of Australia is of course relative — the drafting and 
passage of Canadian counter-terrorism legislation in contrast being tested against 
minimal constitutional human rights standards, which in turn provide a further 
foundation for constitutional review. That basic obligation and cultural influence is 
                                                 
41  See, for example, Jeremy Millard, ‘Investigative Hearings under the Anti-Terrorism 
Act‘ (2002) 60 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 79; W Wesley Pue, ‘The 
War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?‘ (2003) 
41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 267, 286–7; Stanley Cohen, ‘Safeguards in and 
Justifications for Canada’s New Anti-Terrorism Act‘ (2002) 14 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 99, 101; Kent Roach, ‘The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime 
Based Response to Terrorism‘ in Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach 
(eds), The Security of Freedom Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001) 132 
esp 133–8. 
42  See Roach, ‘‘’above n 41, 132: ‘The first danger is that citizens and elected 
representatives may be too quick to accept as wise or necessary what the 
government’s lawyers conclude is permissible to do…Charter-proofing is now an 
entrenched part of the legislative process in Canada, but it presents dangers especially 
if governments become more concerned about avoiding invalidity of legislation under 
the Charter than living up to its broader purposes and spirit. Charter-proofing can be 
a matter of shrewdly predicting what courts will be prepared to do. Concerns exist, 
however, that courts, especially on sensitive matters such as security, will be 
reluctant to strike legislation down‘. See also W Wesley Pue, ‘The War on Terror: 
Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?‘ (2003) 41 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 267, 286–7: ‘In Canadian political discourse, seemingly offensive 
measures are rendered more widely acceptable than might otherwise be the case if 
they are credibly said to be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. During debate on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Charter was used 
effectively, though misleadingly, as a pivot point for ministerial media spin. 
“Charter-proofing”, however, is a minimal attainment. It confuses one piece of 
evidence regarding fundamental constitutional principles (the Charter) for the whole 
and mistakes formal constitutional compliance with legislative wisdom. To predict a 
bill will survive Charter scrutiny implies nothing about the ways police officers will 
use it, nothing about the effectiveness of the bill in relation to its desired ends, and 
little about its consonance with larger principles of constitutionalism’. 
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absent in the Australian legislative process, allowing significantly greater latitude 
for concentrated executive power to manifest itself in counter-terrorism legislation. 
The Canadian legislative approach highlights a second influence, namely the 
systematic manner in which the constitutionality of the counter-terrorism 
investigative hearings mechanism was conducted in Re Application under s 83.28 of 
the Criminal Code43 and Re Vancouver Sun.44 A majority of the Canadian Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the investigative hearings mechanism as 
consistent with the Charter.45 That process involved detailed consideration of 
whether the legislation infringed s 7 of the Charter (right against self-incrimination) 
and if so, whether the infringement was a reasonable limit, prescribed by law, as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s 1 of the 
Charter; secondly, whether the legislation infringed the principles of judicial 
independence and impartiality guaranteed under s 11(d) of the Charter and if so, 
whether the infringement was a reasonable limit, prescribed by law, as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s 1 of the Charter; 
and thirdly, whether the legislation interfered with the principles of independence 
and impartiality established by the Preamble to the Constitution Act 1867. 
Again, the absence of an Australian bill of rights means that there is no obligation 
for the executive and for legislative drafters to test proposed measures against 
fundamental human rights standards. The executive is therefore empowered with 
greater legislative reach and a broader array of legislative options. In political 
terms, that eases the possibility of serial legislative reform, incrementally eroding 
civil and political rights by touching upon community fear. Similarly, there is no 
comparably rights-orientated framework in which constitutional review of the 
legislation for consistency with human rights can be conducted.  
D.  Australian responses to the UN Human Rights system  
In understanding the Australian legislation through the context of the absence of a 
bill of rights, further appreciation of its character arises from the context of 
Australia’s engagement in human rights obligations within the framework of the 
UN treaty committee system in recent years. As Australia is a party to the major 
UN human rights treaties with individual communications processes to treaty 
committees, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee Against Torture 
                                                 
43  [2004] 2 SCR 248. 
44  [2004] 2 SCR 332. 
45  See Re Application under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code [2004] 2 SCR 248, paras 25–
54 per McLaughlin CJ, Iacobucci, Major and Arbour JJ. Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ 
dissented. 
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(CAT), this provides an important medium for comprehending the context in which 
the Australian legislation has emerged. Apart from circumstantial evidentiary 
corroboration of the pursuit of particular attitudes and policies that such materials 
provide, there is also the practical dimension of possible access to the individual 
communications process to the UN Committees that persons subject to questioning 
and detention warrants may invoke. 
In broad terms, the Australian approach within the last few years has been to 
register major dissatisfaction with the UN Human rights treaty system46 and to 
pursue a range of detailed initiatives to have that system reformed.47 
                                                 
46  See Minister for Foreign Affairs Press Releases: “Government to Review UN Treaty 
Committees”, 24–30 March 2000; “Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations 
Committees” 29 August 2000; “Australian Initiative to Improve the Effectiveness of 
the UN Treaty Committees” 5 April 2001; “Australia’s Criticisms of the UN Human 
Rights Committee System Validated by New Report” 21 May 2001; “UN Report Has 
No Credibility” 22 March 2002; “Australia Elected Chair of UN Commission on 
Human Rights” 20 January 2004; “Progress Made to Reform UN Treaty Bodies” 9 
March 2006; Hilary Charlesworth and Penelope Matthew, ‘A response to the 
government’s human rights treaty review‘ The Age (Melbourne) 12 September 2000 
??; Elizabeth Evatt, ‘How Australia “Supports” the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty System‘ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 3; Dianne Otto, ‘From “reluctance” to 
“exceptionalism”: the Australian approach to the domestic implementation of human 
rights‘ (2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 219; David Kinley and Penny Martin, 
‘International Human Rights at Home: Addressing the Politics of Denial‘ (2002) 26 
Melbourne University Law Review 466.  
47  See Joint Media Release Minister for Foreign Affairs, Attorney General and Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs “Australian Initiative to Improve the 
Effectiveness of the UN Treaty Committees” 5 April 2001: “Australia will pursue a 
range of measures aimed at making the United Nations Treaty Committee system 
more efficient and workable and to increase the momentum for their reform…A high-
level diplomatic initiative with Ministerial leadership is a key outcome of a review of 
the treaty committee system…While this will be a long term commitment, the 
Australian initiative also seeks outcomes that are practical, achievable and of 
immediate demonstrable benefit to the committee system and the cause of 
international human rights”; Minister for Foreign Affairs Media Releases: “Australia 
Elected Chair of UN Commission on Human Rights” 20 January 2004: “Over the 
past few years, Australia has worked hard to strengthen and improve the operation of 
the United Nations human rights machinery. The major focus of this work has been 
the Government’s treaty body reform initiative announced in 2000. Australia has 
already hosted three workshops in Geneva to promote treaty body reform”; 
“Australian Re-elected to UN Human Rights Committee” 12 September 2004: “As 
Chair of the Commission on Human Rights, Australia strives to improve and 
strengthen the operation of the UN’s human rights machinery, and promote focused 
and effective consideration of human rights issues”; “Progress Made to Reform UN 
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Indicative of that dissatisfaction and signalling a harder policy edge was the 
observation within the ministerial statement that:  
“Within the framework of Australia’s continuing commitment to international 
human rights standards and monitoring, the Government will adopt a more 
robust and strategic approach to Australia’s interaction with the treaty 
committee system both to maximise positive outcomes for Australia and 
enhance the effectiveness of the system in general”.48  
The new approach has manifested itself in appearances before UN treaty body 
committees49 in the presentation of Australia’s states party reports, making for a 
distinctive methodology.50  
The importance of these developments is again in the contextual and attitudinal 
indications provided, particularly as key rights in the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights, Convention Against Torture and Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the relevant treaties for the states parties 
                                                                                                                             
Treaty Bodies” 9 March 2006: “The importance of treaty body reform is now widely 
accepted by UN member states, the UN Secretary-General, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and her office, and increasingly by members of the treaty bodies 
themselves. In addition, at the 2005 UN Summit, world leaders resolved to improve 
the effectiveness of these bodies”. 
48  “Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees” 29 August 2000. 
49  Namely the Human Rights Committee, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Committee Against Torture and the individual 
communication and reporting procedures respectively under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention Against Torture. 
50  This distinctive methodology reflects key principles in the Joint Ministerial Statement 
“Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees”, including the 
observation in the body of the text above and the fact that “reporting to and 
representation at treaty committees be based on a more economical and selective 
approach where appropriate”. It is no coincidence that this new approach has firstly 
become evident in 2005 in submitting periodic reports to and meeting with the CERD 
Committee, as this Committee attracted the greatest Government censure: see 
Attorney General Williams “Article on the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination”, 29 March 2000. See especially 
Committee On The Elimination Of Racial Discrimination Sixty Sixth Session 
Consideration of Reports, Comments and Information Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 9 of the Convention 1 March 2005 UN Document CERD/C/SR/1685 
comments of Mike Smith, leader of the Australian delegation at paras 1–9 and later at 
para 61, Mr Pillai at paras 10–14, Mr Alves at para 35 and Mr de Goutees at para 39. 
A similar, but perhaps slightly less reactive approach can be expected in Australia’s 
upcoming Fifth Report to the Human Rights Committee under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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reports, are engaged, challenged and impinged upon by the Australian questioning 
and detention legislation.51 On each occasion when the issue of compliance with 
international human rights obligations has been raised in relation to the questioning 
and detention laws, the official Australian response has been to confirm 
international law compliance, with minimal information provided to support that 
claim.52 
E.  The Australian government’s preferred model of human rights  
Australia’s critical and sceptical approaches to the UN human rights treaty 
committee system logically brings us to the Government’s preferred human rights 
model, set out in a comprehensive document released in December 2004 and 
intended to be submitted as part of Australia’s reporting to the UN committee 
                                                 
51  International human rights considerations were raised in submissions to 2002 
Parliamentary Committee hearings into the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 (Cth). See in particular those submissions referred to in the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional References Committee report Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters 
Canberra: The Senate, 2002, namely Amnesty International (Submission 136), 
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights (Submission 177), International Commission 
of Jurists (Submission 237), Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic) 
(Submission 243), Law Institute of Victoria Inc (Submission 294) and the Law 
Council of Australia (Submission 299) and discussion in the report at pages 27–29, 
52, 79–80, 103, 120 and 132; those submissions listed in the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD An Advisory Report on the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 Canberra; 
Parliament of Commonwealth of Australia 2002, namely the Castan Centre for 
Human Rights Law (Submission 111), International Commission of Jurists 
(Submission 120) and Amnesty International (Submissions 140 and 145) and 
discussion in the report at pages 22–23. See also submissions to the 2005 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD review ASIO’s Questioning 
and Detention Powers Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of 
Division 3 of Part III in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, 
particularly International Commission of Jurists (Submission 60), Castan Centre for 
Human Rights Law (Submission 75), Amnesty International Australia (Submission 
81), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Submission 85) and Chief 
Minister ACT Government (Submission 93) and discussion in the report at pp 28–29 
and 53–54.  
52  See the later discussion under the heading “Asserted compliance with international 
human rights obligations and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1373”. 
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system, Australia’s National Framework For Human Rights National Action 
Plan.53  
The document gives considerable emphasis to the role of representative and 
responsible government and Parliamentary institutions as the most effective 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights, with this emphasis being 
particularly illuminating in the context of counter-terrorism questioning and 
detention legislation. Some relevant examples from the document are:     
Australia’s robust system of human rights protection — The central features 
of our constitutional system are the doctrines of “responsible government” 
under which the Executive is accountable to the Parliament and the Parliament 
to the people…In addition, a network of parliamentary committees exists, 
with specific responsibilities to review various spheres of government activity 
and legislation.54 
Promoting a strong free democracy - Australia has one of the most effective 
representative democracies in the world. The Government considers that 
Australia’s federal structure, independent judiciary and robust representative 
parliamentary institutions play an integral role in protecting human rights and 
provide a bulwark against abuses of power and denials of fundamental 
freedoms.55 
Representative government — Members of the Australian community can also 
play an active role in representative democracy by making submissions to 
Australian, State and Territory parliamentary committees, which examine 
issues of public concern or proposed legislation.56 
Enhancing the effectiveness of national security - Efforts to achieve national 
security must not jeopardise basic human rights…Australia’s democratic 
traditions and processes are its greatest ally and greatest strength in the war on 
terror. These traditions and processes are the tools that will help combat 
terrorism and protect and preserve our human rights.57 
Such reliance upon classic parliamentary doctrines and institutions is, in the context 
of national security questioning and detention powers, highly problematic. 
Substantial inadequacies in accountability include the often cited, bipartisan 
ministerial response of not commenting on matters of national security (in this 
                                                 
53  Australia’s National Framework For Human Rights National Action Plan Canberra: 
Attorney-General’s Department, 2005. 
54  At pp 5–6. 
55  At p 8. 
56  At p 71. 
57  At pp 21–22. 
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instance, questioning and detention warrants, providing further dimensions to the 
prohibitions on primary and secondary disclosure of warrant58 and operational 
information,59 instituted by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth),60) not 
commenting upon “operational matters” (as defined by the commentator, the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General) and the use of the Glomar response61 “to neither 
confirm nor deny” matters relating to national security. The Attorney-General is 
then able to become the sole source of authorised public disclosures of information 
on the operation of the warrants, thereby able to control debate and accountability 
through selective release of information and invoke “operational matters” as a 
rationalisation for declining further disclosure. 
A further related example of the distinctive problems emerging from the responsible 
government aspect of this preferred human rights model, as applied to the detention 
and questioning powers, has been the ministerial warrant thresholds for the seeking 
of a warrant under s 34D of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). Ministerial responsibility, in 
the sense of having to personally be satisfied of preconditions in relation to the 
questioning and detention warrant powers, has in fact been criticised by the 
Attorney-General.  It was suggested by the Attorney-General that a decision not to 
request a particular detention and questioning warrant in relation to a foreign 
                                                 
58  The Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended that ‘consideration be given to 
amending the Act so that the secrecy provisions affecting questioning –only warrants 
be revised to allow for disclosure of the existence of the warrant‘: Joint Parliamentary 
Committee 2005 Report, 94 (Recommendation 17). 
59  The problems for public accountability and scrutiny arising from the two year 
prohibition under the then s 34VAA (now s 34ZS of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) of 
release of operational information, broadly defined, without authorisation, are 
canvassed in the Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 84–88. The Committee 
recommended “that the term ‘operational information’ be reconsidered to reflect 
more clearly the operational concerns and needs of ASIO. In particular, consideration 
be given to redefining the then s 34VAA(5): Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 
Report, 89 (Recommendation 16). 
60  Extensive provisions prohibit the disclosure of information relating to warrants and 
questioning both before the expiry of the warrant (ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34ZS 
(1)(a)–(f)) and in the two years after the expiry of the warrant (ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) 
s 34ZS (2)(a)–(f)).  
61  The Glomar response originates from the United States case of Military Audit Project 
v Casey 656 F 2d 724 (1981) and was a judicial development upon the exemption 
provisions of Title 5 United States Code s 552(b) (The United States Freedom of 
Information Act). It has been developed and applied in a number of cases including 
Phillipi v Central Intelligence Agency 655 F 2d 1325 (1981), Asfar v Department of 
State 702 F 2d 1125 (1983) and Hunt v Central Intelligence Agency 981 F 2d 1116 
(1992). 
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national was based on difficulties in satisfying the necessary legal criteria62 for the 
warrant request to proceed to the issuing authority, adverse international 
comparisons being drawn with ability to detain under the French system.63 
In contrast, the warrant procedure, including the warrant threshold requirements for 
ministerial approval,64 were earlier portrayed as a significant and strict preliminary 
safeguard65 of a kind that conforms to the preferred representative and responsible 
government model of human rights protection. Indeed, that observation is 
strengthened by the fact that the procedures complained of by the Attorney-General 
are in the exact form as drafted by the Government as appeared in the original 
version of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment 
                                                 
62  See House of Representatives Hansard 3 November 2003 21727–21728, 21729 (Hon 
P Ruddock) and National Nine Network ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock‘ Sunday 
Program, 2 November 2003. 
63  See ABC Television, ‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions‘ Lateline, 27 
October 2003: ‘But what you do have is an example here of broader powers that an 
intelligence agency in a developed Western country — namely France — has in 
relation to being able to detain and question people‘ and ‘New anti-terrorism laws too 
cumbersome: Ruddock‘ ABC News Online, 10 November 2003. This matter is 
discussed in greater detail under the heading “Advocacy of the French and other 
systems of extended detention”. 
64  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3)(a), (b) and (c). 
65  See Attorney-General’s Press Release 21 March 2002 “ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Bill Introduced” and House of Representatives Hansard 20 March 2003 
13172. See also Philip Ruddock, ‘The Commonwealth Response to September 11: 
The Rule of Law and National Security‘, Speech at Gilbert and Tobin Centre of 
Public Law — National Forum on the War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law, New 
South Wales Parliament House, 10 November 2003. The strictness of that safeguard 
is a contestable proposition, however, as the issuing authority for the warrant has 
narrower grounds for satisfaction for issue of the warrant than the Attorney-General, 
including no requirement “that the issuing authority take account of the efficacy of 
relying on other methods of collecting the intelligence…Nor is there any requirement 
that the issuing authority be satisfied of the additional grounds necessary to trigger a 
warrant for detention”(as distinct from a questioning only warrant): Joint 
Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 35. The Committee recommended “That the 
issuing authority be required to be satisfied that other methods of intelligence 
gathering would not be effective”: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 37 
(Recommendation 1). That recommendation was explicitly rejected by the 
Government: see Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Report 
on the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Government response — 
March 2006. For further commentary challenging the warrant process as a “strict 
safeguard” see Sarah Pritchard, ‘The counter-terrorism Bills‘ 2002 (Winter) Bar 
News: Journal of the NSW Bar Association 10, 15 and Michael Head, ‘“Counter-
Terrorism” Laws: A Threat To Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional 
Rights‘ , above n 2, 678. 
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(Terrorism) Bill, introduced into the House of Representatives on 21 March 2002.66 
The same clause made its way into the final version of the amending legislation, 
surviving the many amendments made to the bill in the Senate.67  
Interestingly, the preventative detention legislation,68 avoids that aspect of 
ministerial control over the warrant issuing process altogether, whilst the control 
orders69 aspect of the legislation only provides a request for a simple consent of the 
Attorney-General70 to the making of an application before an issuing Court. The 
legislation is drafted so that satisfaction of the criteria is the responsibility of a 
senior Australian Federal Police (AFP) member71 and the issuing Court.72 
Accordingly, there is no direct ministerial responsibility for satisfaction of the 
criteria73 — so that under the government’s prevailing system of ministerial 
responsibility, the Attorney-General will never be responsible for actions relating to 
the issue of a control order. 
The above matters provide some strong background and contextual factors in the 
development and continuing evolution of a distinctively Australian counter-
terrorism intelligence gathering mechanism. That development and evolution is 
decidedly executive in orientation, conferring considerable discretion, 
characteristics strengthened by increasing levels of legislated secrecy surrounding 
the operation of powers.74 The rhetoric of representative and responsible 
government, articulated as the preferred mechanism for the protection of human 
rights, actually lends itself in a national security context to the increase of executive 
power, a further transformation of relations between the arms of government and 
the citizenry. 
                                                 
66  See Attorney-General’s Media Release “ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 
Introduced” 21 March 2002. 
67  See House of Representatives Hansard 3 November 2003, 21731 and 4 November 
2003, 21854. 
68  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) div 105. 
69  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) div 104. 
70  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 4  s 104.2 (1) to (5) and s 104.3. 
71  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 4  s 104.2 (2).  
72  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2)  2005 (Cth) sch 4  s 104.3 and s 104.4. 
73  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 4 s 104.2 (4), whilst reflecting the 
requirement of the Attorney-General’s written consent as a pre-requisite for 
requesting an interim control order (s 104.2 (1)), states that ‘The Attorney-General’s 
consent may be made subject to changes being made to the draft request (including 
the draft of the interim control order to be requested).‘. 
74  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34ZS(1)(a) to (f) and s 34ZS(2)(a) to (f). The Anti-
Terrorism (No 2) Act 2005 (Cth) similarly includes disclosure offences relating to 
preventative detention, to a range of persons: the detainee (s 105.41 (1)), lawyers 
(s 105.41(2)), parent\guardian (s 105.41(3)), interpreters (s 105.41(5)), disclosure 
recipients (s 105.41(6)) and monitors (s 105.41 (7)). 
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In the absence of a bill of rights and its cultivation of rights literacy, culture and a 
structured analysis of proposed legislation, as well as exploration and testing of 
policy options, a much greater scope exists for politically advantageous and partisan 
applications for counter-terrorism law reform. From the inception of substantial and 
ongoing counter-terrorism legislative reform from September 11, 2001 to June 30, 
2005, Opposition and minor party control of the Senate meant those types of 
political applications have been partly constrained by the hearings and investigative 
reports of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation75 and References76 
Committees and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD77 and 
the impact upon legislative amendments that the investigations and reports of those 
Committees were able to produce. 
Having surveyed the context and factors facilitating this selective internationalism, 
it is apposite to consider some of its key features and manifestations, cultivated by 
the Government and the Attorney-General’s department in developing a counter-
terrorism questioning and detention regime. The starting point is by examining 
examples from parliamentary processes of this selective internationalisation of 
material, especially as the system of representative and responsible government is 
cited as the government’s preferred and effective human rights model. The 
extravagance of this claim and the vulnerabilities of the model in its failure to 
integrate civil and political rights with counter-terrorism responses are apparent. 
Other significant examples of selective internationalism in developing this counter-
terrorism questioning and detention regime will also be explored. 
V.  SELECTIVE INTERNATIONALISM AT WORK: REASONS AND EXPLANATIONS FOR 
THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL 
A.  Dealing with and responding to overseas legislation 
There has never been a sufficient or coherent explanation as to why the critically 
defining feature of the Australian model, namely the capacity to question non 
suspect persons who may be thought to have information about terrorism offences 
through a process of secret, incommunicado detention, was necessary in Australia 
                                                 
75  Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Provisions of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, June 2002. 
76  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related 
matters Canberra: The Senate, December 2002. 
77  Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD An Advisory Report on the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Bill 2002 Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, May 2002. 
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when it was not invoked or implemented in other comparable jurisdictions.78 The 
material emerging from Parliamentary Committee examinations of the then bill 
provides strong insights into this Australianisation process. Overseas examples are 
acknowledged and referred to in scrutinising the bill, but such examples are 
rationalised as inappropriate and irrelevant and distinguished from the Australian 
detention and questioning provisions.  
B.  Acknowledging overseas legislation 
The starting point is an acknowledgment that overseas legislation was referred to in 
the preparation of the Australian legislation.79 Such an acknowledgement is an 
essential step in reconciling the fact that the Australian legislation is different and 
exceeds in scope the international examples and that little, if anything, is modelled 
in the drafting upon those more rights sensitive international examples. Such 
considerations are evident in the following exchanges: 
Senator Bolkus (Chair) The legislation that the government has put before the 
parliament is distinctly different from legislation in other jurisdictions, such as 
the UK, USA, Canada and so on. Can you tell us whether those models were 
considered and why, for instance, some of them were not embraced by the 
government? 
Mr Hollard. The major cornerstones of consideration were the obvious 
culprits — the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and New Zealand. 
                                                 
78  For discussion on the general point of a failure of the Government to solidly 
articulate and substantiate a case for the far reaching questioning and detention 
powers, see Ian Barker, ‘Human Rights in an age of counter-terrorism‘ (2005) 26 
Australian Bar Review 267, 269–70, and in the context of a lack of publicly available 
risk assessment of terrorism as a foundation for the drafting of terrorism provisions, 
see Michaelsen, ‘‘above n 2, 329–34, under the heading “Assessing the Risk of a 
Terrorism Attack in Australia”. A distinctive argument about the timing and 
circumstances of Australia becoming an al-Qaida target is made by Dennis 
Richardson in ‘The Global Nature of Terrorism‘ (2004) 16(4) The Sydney Papers 
125, 128–31. 
79  See Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 30 April 2002, 
25: “In preparing the legislation we did have regard to legislation in the UK, Canada, 
the US and — although I am not sure — New Zealand”. See also Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 2 May 2002, 225 ‘For the benefit of 
the Committee, we have prepared a matrix that shows the UK provisions, the 
Australian provisions, the Canadian provisions and the US provisions, which we 
think might assist the committee in its deliberations‘. This document was accepted as 
Submission 146. See also Minister for Justice, Senator Chris Elison, Senate Hansard 
10 December 2002, 7632: ‘Relevant legislation from the United Kingdom, Canada 
and the United States was considered when drafting this bill’. 
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The legislation from those jurisdictions was in fact considered in the drafting 
of this legislation…80 
Senator Bolkus (Chair). I note that the UK changed its law in 2001 and 
Canada changed its laws in 2002. Neither jurisdiction goes as far as you are 
proposing to go in terms of this legislation’s capacity to detain people…for a 
length of time on the basis that they may know something. A deliberate 
decision must have been taken by those jurisdictions not to go down the road 
that Australia is going down. Why do we feel that there is a greater need in 
Australia to do what is proposed here? 
Mr Hollard. Why they have not gone down that path I do not know; I am not 
in a position to say and I do not know whether any of my colleagues are in a 
position to say….As I say, why they have not chosen to go down a similar 
path and look at this prevention and what agencies might do beforehand I do 
not know. I just cannot answer that question.81 
Glimpses of other rationales or claims for rejecting the overseas models do appear. 
These include anticipatory and preventative intelligence gathering and the ‘fact that 
nobody had done it before I do not think we saw as a barrier to what we should or 
should not do’.82 The latter comment is particularly revealing as it reflects an open 
ended legislative canvas and without a bill of rights, a methodology apparently 
unconstrained by rights indicators such as justification, proportionality and 
necessity.83  
C.  Differentiating the purposes of the Australian legislation and overseas 
legislation 
Most illuminating are the persistent arguments attempting to render irrelevant and 
inappropriate critical comparisons and alternatives to the Australian questioning and 
detention regime. The most prominent of these arguments has been the 
differentiation of the Australian legislation, characterised as for an intelligence 
gathering purpose, in contrast to the United Kingdom and Canadian legislation, 
                                                 
80  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 12 November 2002, 
3. 
81  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 12 November 2002, 
3–4. 
82  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 12 November 2002, 
3. 
83  A similarly utilitarian attitude is also revealed in other evidence: see Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 19 May 2005, 4 ‘The 
legislation that was initially introduced into the parliament with our support and 
advice was much simpler and was, of course, tougher’ (Mr Richardson, Director-
General, ASIO). 
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characterised as for a criminal law investigation and prosecution purpose.84 Close 
examination reveals this argument as primarily one of selective convenience, given 
the workings of the respective United Kingdom85 and Canadian86 legislation.   
Certainly, the Canadian investigative hearings mechanism, although located within 
the Canadian Criminal Code, cannot be accurately described as criminal 
investigation legislation. Instead, a judicially conducted investigative hearing, with 
attendance, not detention, requirements created.87 There is both derivative and 
direct use immunity regarding information obtained under the obligation to answer 
questions,88 rendering the information gleaned from the hearing inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution. A person has the right to retain and instruct counsel at any 
stage of the proceedings.89 There is a qualitative difference between being under 
arrest and in custody and being required to attend. Arrest by warrant regarding the 
investigative hearing is permitted only in circumstances of evading service of the 
order, absconding, failure to attend or to remain in attendance.90  
This differentiation of criminal law and intelligence gathering purposes in 
departmental evidence appeared directed towards rejecting more restricted 
intelligence gathering models from comparable jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom and Canada. Such differentiation was also used to erroneously categorise, 
as a criminal law model, an alternative intelligence gathering proposal, based on the 
Canadian investigative hearing model under Part II. 1 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code, adapted for Australian constitutional circumstances.91 This proposal was 
similar to the Canadian investigative hearing, but did not proceed from a criminal 
law model.92 However, in sharp contrast and contradiction, the UK and Canadian 
                                                 
84  See, for example, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 
12 November 2002, 3–4. 
85  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK): in fact, this legislation has been considered as the basis for 
preventative detention legislation in Australia, on the grounds of an existing capacity 
to arrest and hold suspected terrorists (see ss 40 and 41 of the Act) for a period of 14 
days, as part of a criminal law investigative process. This 14 day period (increased 
from 7 days in 2003 by the Criminal Justice Act (2003 c 44) UK, pt 13 s 306(4)) was 
further increased to a maximum of 28 days by the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK): See 
s 23(7) of the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK). 
86  Criminal Code (Canada) pt II.1 Terrorism ss 83.01–83.33. 
87  See s 83.28 of Criminal Code (Canada). 
88  See s 83.28(10)(a) of Criminal Code (Canada). 
89  See s 83.28(11) of the Criminal Code (Canada). 
90  See s 83.29 of the Criminal Code (Canada). 
91  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 18 November 2002, 
107. 
92  See Submissions 24 and 24A to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee Inquiry into the Australian Security Intelligence Legislation (Terrorism) 
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schemes were elsewhere invoked to argue that the detention procedures for non-
suspects under the Australian legislation were not comparable with legislation used 
in Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa.93  
Moreover, in the May 2005 hearings before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD review of Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) questioning 
and detention provisions, the Attorney-General’s department persisted with a 
similar appraisal of the Canadian investigative hearings mechanism and the limited 
circumstances of arrest attaching to that mechanism.94  
D.  Claiming conformity of Australian legislation with international comparative 
examples 
An alternative argument, boldly asserted, is a claim of broad conformity and 
comparability of the Australian questioning and detention provisions with 
international comparative examples. This approach has gained increasing 
prominence. That the making of such a claim is inconsistent with and contradictory 
to the differentiating arguments from international comparative examples that were 
strenuously advanced and outlined above appears to matter little. As the Justice 
Minister, Senator Ellison asserted: 
In relation to the question of international precedence, the government rejects 
any assertion that this legislation is out of step with international precedence. 
What we say is that, in developing this legislation, consideration has been 
given to the provisions in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. 
The UK Terrorism Act 2000, the Canadian Antiterrorism Act 2001 and this 
bill all provide that a person may be detained and questioned for up to 48 
hours.95 
This assertion casually dismisses a defining point of common law democracies, 
namely the right of innocent persons to proceed freely about their lawful business 
without the prospect of arrest and detention except on reasonable grounds of the 
                                                                                                                             
Amendment Bill and witness submission Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee Hansard 14 November 2002, 90–104. 
93  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 18 November 2001, 
120. 
94  Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 19 May 2005, 7. 
See also comments by HREOC on the Attorney-General’s department submission, 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 20 May 2005, 21. 
Again, Section 83.28(4)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code, referred to in the 
Attorney-General’s department evidence relates to the power to question non suspect 
persons before an investigative hearing, and is not a power to detain. Such persons 
are required to remain in attendance at the hearing, but they are not detained. 
95  Senate Hansard 19 June 2003, 11767. 
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suspicion of the commission of a crime. It ignores the significant, and probably 
exponential, transformation in relations between the citizen and the state, through 
serial expansion of the definition of “terrorism offence”,96 which forms the 
platform97 for the operation of the Australian questioning and detention provisions. 
That argument has been further refined in casual, corrosive ways in circumstances 
emerging from the 2005 Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO ASIS and DSD’s 
review of Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth).98 In a supplementary submission to 
the Committee,99 the Attorney-General’s department pursued the broad conformity 
and comparability argument of the Australian legislation to international 
comparative examples, within a claimed holistic frame of reference.100 Once again, 
the process of Australianisation of international comparative examples is apparent, 
                                                 
96  See Criminal Code (Cth) s 101.2 (Providing or receiving training connected with 
terrorist acts), s 101.4 (Possessing things connected with terrorist acts), s 101.5 
(Collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts), s 101.6 (other acts 
done in preparation for, or planning, terrorist acts), s 102.2 (Directing the activities of 
a terrorist organisation), s 102.3 (Membership of a terrorist organisation), s 102.4 
(Recruiting for a terrorist organisation), s 102.5 (Training a terrorist organisation or 
receiving training from a terrorist organisation), s 102.6 (Getting funds to or from a 
terrorist organisation), s 102.7 (Providing support to a terrorist organisation), s 102.8 
(Associating with terrorist organisations) and s 103.1 (Financing terrorism).  
97  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F(4)(a): ‘The Minister may, by writing, consent to the 
making of the request, but only if the Minister is satisfied: (a) that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the warrant to be requested will 
substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a 
terrorism offence.’ (emphasis added). 
98  The report of the Committee was tabled in Parliament on 30 November 2005: see 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD ASIO’s Questioning and 
Detention Powers Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 
3 of Part III in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Canberra: 
Parliament of Commonwealth of Australia, 2005. 
99  Submission No 102 to Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of div 3 of pt III in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. 
100  ‘As we and ASIO noted in the public hearings, it is necessary to examine the whole 
suite of legislation that is in place and the surrounding circumstances‘: Submission 
102, above n 99, 13; ‘It is true that the detail of the legislation is different in different 
countries. This is not unusual, and it alone is not sufficient to say that the Australian 
legislation is therefore deficient or inadequate. In comparing legislation from 
different countries, it is important to take account of the context in which that 
legislation has arisen, its objectives and how the legislation is used in practice…In 
developing Division III of Part III of the ASIO Act, other countries’ legislation was 
taken into account but our legislation has been framed in a way to suit our 
environment and the purpose of intelligence-gathering in that environment‘: 
Submission 102, above n 99, 18. 
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in an attempt to neutralise criticism that ASIO’s questioning and detention regime is 
more severe than in like-minded countries, including the matter of non-suspects.101  
E. Claiming superiority of the Australian legislation over the legislation of other 
jurisdictions 
A further area of selective internationalism arises in relation to the claim of 
safeguards over the questioning and detention powers. That claim has been more 
recently aggrandised to a claim of superiority of the Australian system, asserted on 
the basis of the legislative detail of the Australian provisions.102 That claim is 
fraught with difficulties. In general terms, there are in fact significant gaps in that 
“detail”. 
As has previously been argued, reliance upon a system of representative and 
responsible government as the preferred model of human rights protection is 
inherently problematic in national security matters.103 That difficulty is 
compounded where there is a significant emphasis in the legislation upon extending 
executive power and discretions. In fact, the looseness of the Australian model, with 
its executive power and discretions heavily reliant upon assumptions of personal 
and institutional integrity104 and personalised, verbal assurances that exceptional 
powers will be used responsibly and as a last resort,105 means a considerable falling 
short of that “detail” claim. 
                                                 
101  Submission 102, above n 99, 13. 
102  Submission 102, above n 99, 18 ‘The Australian legislation is specific and 
transparent, and has significant built-in accountability mechanisms and safeguards‘. 
A number of adverse claims are also made about the lack of specificity in the 
Canadian legislation: see Submission 102, above n 99, 15–18. 
103  See the discussion under the heading “The Australian government’s preferred model 
of human rights”, above. 
104  See, for example, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 
12 November 2002, 21 and 18 November 2002, 125–6. Similar rationalisations were 
ventilated before the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee inquiry 
into the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth): see Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee Hansard 14 November 2005, 38 and 18 November 2005, 27. 
105  The last resort criterion has been variously cited: see Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee Hansard 18 November 2002, 125; House of Representatives 
Hansard 20 March 2003, 13172 and Attorney-General’s Press Release 21 March 
2002, “ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill Introduced”. The “last resort” 
characterisation was also made of the ASIO questioning and detention regime in the 
Attorney-General’s Department submissions: Submission to Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of Division 3 of Part III of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Questioning and Detention 
Powers, 4 and 5 and Submission 290 A Attachment B, 8 to the November 2005 
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It is also somewhat ironic that the Attorney-General’s department supplementary 
submission should praise the characteristics of the legislation106 which the 
Government generally opposed and reached only as a reluctant “compromise”107 
and which the Attorney General has described as “too checked”108 and “where 
possibly we have an outcome that is third or fourth best”.109 
Moreover, the existing detail and most safeguards only emerged from a lengthy 
process of parliamentary review, including committee review,110 at a time when the 
Opposition and minor parties controlled the Senate. Indeed, the original bill, 
introduced in March 2002, was notorious for its poor legislative drafting111 and its 
absence of safeguards.112 It was then subjected to extensive, negotiated 
                                                                                                                             
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee Inquiry Into Provisions Of the Anti-
Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005. 
106  See, for example, Submission 102, above n 99, 18 “The Australian legislation is 
specific and transparent, and has significant built-in accountability mechanisms and 
safeguards. While detention is available, it is clear that it can only be used in 
circumstances that truly require it”. 
107  See Attorney-General’s Media Release  11 June 2003 “Compromise For The Sake Of 
National Security”. 
108  Hon P Ruddock comments to ABC Radio reported in “Australian to Review Anti-
terror Laws with Eye on Stronger Powers” 3 November 2003 
<http://sg.news.yahoo.com/031103/1/3fjdb.html>  
109  Hon P Ruddock “The Commonwealth Response to September 11: The Rule of Law 
and National Security”, Speech at Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law — 
National Forum on the War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law, New South Wales 
Parliament House, 10 November 2003. 
110  See the reports of the three Parliamentary Committees on the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth): Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002; Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee Provisions of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002; and Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters 
111  See comments of Senator Faulkner, Senate Hansard 17 June 2003, 11,669-11,670 .. 
Some examples of poor legislative drafting included the fact that the bill did not 
require that a person taken into custody pursuant to a warrant be brought before a 
prescribed authority immediately for questioning, enabling extended detention for the 
28 day duration of the warrant, as well as the fact that no use immunity for 
information provided by detainees was provided under the bill, defeating the purpose 
of the legislated obligation to provide answers to questions. 
112  These difficulties included, but were not limited to, indefinite detention through 
rolling 48 hour warrants, no right of access to legal representation, no protocols 
governing the treatment of detainees, the detention of children of any age under the 
bill without knowledge of their parents or guardians and strip searches able to be 
conducted on children as young as ten years of age. 
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amendments, rather than beginning afresh with new legislation that systematically 
integrated human rights principles within this intelligence gathering mechanism. 
This means that some obvious drafting problems persist, challenging the claim that 
the Australian legislation has a superior system of checks and balances, but also that 
reliance upon representative and responsible government, produces the best 
mechanism of human rights protection in counter-terrorism situations.113 
On this point of detail and comprehensiveness, the submission fails, in its own 
terms, to observe an important contextual matter. In the absence of a bill of rights, 
the Australian legislation must necessarily be more detailed if safeguards are to be 
incorporated. Other than what can be derived from an examination of constitutional 
powers and immunities, there is no external rights document with its resultant 
jurisprudence against which the drafting, enactment and operation of the provisions 
can be tested. The detail of the legislation suggests, if anything, in the absence of a 
bill of rights, an ad hoc process of amendment engrafting safeguards, instead of the 
bill’s inception grounded in drafting conformity with international human rights 
standards increasingly referred to in comparable democracies such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. 
The claim about superiority through detail is contestable on another practical level. 
Loose and ambiguous legislative language persists — a point so at odds with the 
claimed superiority of the representative and responsible government model, where 
the critical nature of the rights and values at stake should allow little tolerance in 
getting the safeguards right. Such complacency may appear because the novelty of 
detention of non suspect persons has been diminished by repetition of the 
circumstances and conditions of the breach of a foundational principle of common 
law liberty114 and the appearance of normality in the operation of the legislation115 
and restraint in its use.116  
                                                 
113  Refer to the extracts from Australia’s National Framework For Human Rights 
National Action Plan, cited above, under the heading “The Australian government’s 
preferred model of human rights”. 
114  See Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO’s 
questioning and detention powers Hansard 19 May 2005, 7, 13–14 and Hansard 20 
May 2005, 16. 
115  See Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 23–24. An interesting operational 
concern of the legislation was raised in the Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 
Report, about the possible overlap in intelligence gathering and policing purposes, in 
part arising from the fact that three people have been charged following use of 
questioning warrants: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 25. This concern 
is reinforced by the Committee’s later recommendation that the issuing authority “be 
required to be satisfied that other methods of intelligence gathering would not be 
effective” on the basis that it “will also act as a strong safeguard against potential 
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Deficiencies in detail are clearly present in the legislation. There is no explicit right 
for a lawyer to be continuously present during questioning, the incommunicado 
elements of the scheme apparent by this failure to create this explicit right, as the 
legislation constantly refers to ‘contact’ with a lawyer, rather than a clear 
requirement or right of presence of that lawyer.117 Significantly, s 34ZP(1)of the 
ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) states ‘To avoid doubt, a person before a prescribed authority 
for questioning under a warrant issued under this Division may be questioned under 
the warrant in the absence of a lawyer of the person’s choice’. Such an ambivalent 
situation relating to the presence of legal representation should be contrasted with 
the right of presence of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security under 
s 34P of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth).118  
The right to have an independent lawyer present during questioning and a right of 
legal access at all times during detention is amongst the most effective safeguards 
against human rights abuses for the subject of a s 34F warrant. The presence of a 
legal representative practically enables access to the Federal Court or High Court 
under respectively ss 19(2) and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
                                                                                                                             
misuse of coercive questioning powers in order to lay the groundwork for charge of 
false and misleading information, where the information is already known to the 
agency”: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 37. 
116  This point was made before the Joint Parliamentary Committee by arguing limited 
use of the then s 34C (now s 34D) ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) procedure: see Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 19 May 2005, 3: “The 
questioning power has been utilised on eight separate occasions since the legislation 
was enacted in July 2003. The detention power has not yet been utilised. No 
individual between the ages of 16 and 18 years has yet been questioned and there has 
been no strip searching undertaken”. In contrast, however, it was revealed at the same 
inquiry that the Canadian investigative hearing mechanism (equivalent to the ASIO 
questioning power) has not been used by federal authorities and that there was only 
one identified instance of its use by a provincial authority; and that the preventative 
arrest power had not been used at all: see Submission 100 to Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO’s Questioning and Detention 
Powers 25 May 2005. 
117  The Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report at 46–7 canvasses some of the 
issues relating to contact with a lawyer, recommending that the legislation ‘be 
amended to guarantee the right of a person subject to a questioning-only or 
questioning and detention warrant to have access to a lawyer and representation 
throughout the questioning process‘: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 48. 
This recommendation does not appear to have been adopted: see ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Act  2006 (Cth) sch 1 ss 34ZO and ZP and s 34E(3). 
118  Section 34P of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) states that “To avoid doubt, for the purposes 
of performing functions under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 
1986, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, or an APS employee 
assisting the Inspector-General, may be present at the questioning or taking into 
custody of a person under this Division”. 
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and s 75(v) of the Commonwealth Constitution and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), 
exercising the right confirmed to seek from a federal court a remedy relating to the 
warrant or treatment of the person in connection with the warrant in s 34J(5) of the 
ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). 
Furthermore, prohibitions on the legal adviser precluded that legal adviser from 
addressing the prescribed authority.119 A legal representative for the person the 
subject of a s 34D warrant should be permitted to address the prescribed authority 
whenever a person exercising authority under the warrant requests of the prescribed 
authority permission for the questioning to continue at the 8 hour and 16 hour 
marks.120 Similarly, the legal representative for the person the subject of a s 34D 
questioning only warrant should be permitted to address the prescribed authority 
whenever the prescribed authority intends to give a direction under s 34K(1) to 
detain that person.121 
Similarly, the definition of “issuing authority” in s 34A of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) 
should be tightened to remove an open-ended discretion in paragraph (b) to appoint 
by regulation a class of persons declared as issuing authorities. The confining of 
                                                 
119  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) former s 34U(4). The Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 
Report at 51 discussed the desirability that a prescribed authority ‘hear submissions 
from the lawyer before discretions are exercised or when matters, such as the scope 
of a question, need to be addressed‘, recommending ‘that subsection 34U(4) be 
amended and that individuals be entitled to make representations through their lawyer 
to the prescribed authority‘: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report at 52 
(Recommendation 5). The ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) merely 
provided for a legal adviser to request an opportunity, during a break in questioning, 
to address the prescribed authority on a matter. The prescribed authority consequently 
controls both the timing of breaks and whether that opportunity will be afforded: see 
ss 34ZQ(7) and (8) of the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), reflecting the 
conclusion that ‘the Government agrees that the lawyer should be entitled to address, 
with the prescribed authority’s consent, the prescribed authority during time when 
questioning is not taking place (where the prescribed authority defers questioning to 
allow for procedural matters to be addressed)’: See Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security Report on the operation, effectiveness and implications 
of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 
1979 Government response- March 2006 Recommendation 5, 2. 
120  This is not reflected in the purely discretionary arrangements of ss 34ZQ(7) and (8) 
of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). Indeed, s 34ZQ(6) states that ‘The legal adviser must not 
intervene in questioning of the subject or address the prescribed authority before 
whom the subject is being questioned, except to request clarification of an ambiguous 
question‘. Furthermore, s 34R(3) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) states that ‘Anyone 
exercising authority under the warrant may request the prescribed authority to permit 
the questioning to continue…The request may be made in the absence of …(b) a 
legal adviser to that person’. 
121  See also s 34K(3) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). 
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issuing authorities to Federal judicial officers, acting in a personal capacity, 
provides an important safeguard in the warrant process. Accordingly, paragraph (b) 
should be amended so that the power to appoint another class of persons can only 
be invoked if there is a judicial finding as to the unconstitutionality of Federal 
judicial officers under paragraph (a) being appointed in a personal role as issuing 
authority, or a explicit ministerial determination, tabled in Parliament, of the 
number of available judicial officers willing to act as issuing authorities falling 
below a determined number and geographical distribution. 
F.  Claiming superiority of the Australian model through asserting failures in 
overseas jurisdictions 
More specific flaws emerge in relation to the departmental approach to legislation 
of three countries criticised in the Attorney-General’s department supplementary 
submission.122 The approach here is distinctive — the asserted failings in the 
overseas legislation are contrasted with the claimed superiority of the Australian 
model, rather than as experiential material from which the Australian model might 
be improved and developed. Furthermore, it is not acknowledged that the cited case 
law from the international jurisdictions has contributed to reviewing human rights 
issues in relation to counter-terrorism laws. 
A first example is found in the material witness provision of the United States 
Code,123 which allows a judicial officer to order the arrest of a person whose 
testimony is material in a criminal proceeding where it is impracticable to secure 
the presence of the person by subpoena. This is cited as a claimed rebuttal to 
objections about the Australian legislative power to detain non-suspects. What is 
discounted is the different context of a grand jury criminal proceeding as against an 
intelligence gathering exercise — another example of the selective usage of the 
criminal law-intelligence gathering distinction. Similarly discounted124 are the 
procedural protections for detained persons which are included elsewhere.125 The 
illustrative case cited126 supporting the claims surrounding detention of non-
suspects is inconclusive as the US District Court vacated the material witness 
warrant upon notification of a Presidential Order declaring Padilla to be an enemy 
combatant and its withdrawal of the grand jury subpoena of Padilla.127 
                                                 
122  See Attorney-General’s Department Supplementary Submission to Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO’s questioning and 
detention powers 22 June 2005, Submission No 102, 13–18. 
123  Title 18, s 3144 USC. Submission 102, above n 122, 13–14. 
124  “Section 3144 does not specifically include any safeguards for the individuals 
detained”: Submission 102, above n 122, 13. 
125  Title 18, s 3142 USC. 
126  Rumsfeld v Padilla 542 US 456 (2004). 
127  Rumsfeld v Padilla 542 US 456 (2004), 2715, fn 3. 
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Subsequently, the US Court of Appeals in Padilla v Hanft128 found that the 
Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force provided the President 
with authorisation to designate a US citizen an enemy combatant and to authorise 
the Secretary of Defence to take him into military custody.129 However, the 
emphasis in the US Courts in relation to enemy combatant designations has been to 
insist upon and uphold basic rule of law values. A subsequent attempt by the US 
Government to transfer Padilla to a civilian criminal jurisdiction,(with which 
Padilla agreed) including vacating the above decision in Padilla v Hanft130of 9 
September 2005, was rejected by the US Court of Appeals on 21 December 2005, 
the Court expressing a number of concerns131 that, if the application was granted, 
would undermine the rule of law and that the matter was properly to be decided by 
the US Supreme Court.The US Supreme Court, following filing in that Court by the 
Solicitor General of an application respecting the custody and transfer of Padilla to 
civilian criminal jurisdiction, subsequently granted the request.132 The issue of a 
proper capacity for review of the classification of a citizen-detainee as an enemy 
combatant, mentioned in the September133 and December134 2005 Padilla cases, 
                                                 
128  Padilla v Hanft 423 F 3d 386 (2005). 
129  See Padilla v Hanft 423 F 3d 386 (2005) at 389: ‘The exceedingly important question 
before us is whether the President of the United States possesses the authority to 
detain militarily a citizen of this country who is closely associated with al Qaeda, an 
entity with which the United States is at war; who took up arms on behalf of that 
enemy and against our country in a foreign combat zone of that war; and who 
thereafter travelled to the United States for the avowed purpose of further prosecuting 
that war on American soil, against American citizens and targets. We conclude that 
the President does possess such authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Joint Resolution enacted by Congress in the wake of the attacks on the 
United States of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court 
is reversed’. 
130  Padilla v Hanft 423 F 3d 386 (2005). 
131  These concerns included a possible attempted avoidance of Supreme Court review of 
the basis of designation as an enemy combatant, the legal irrelevance in the present 
matter of  disclosure of the circumstances surrounding receipt of information 
regarding Padilla’s plans: see Padilla v Hanft 423 F 3d 386 (2005) 586–7: ‘apart 
from the need to protect the appearance of regularity in the judicial process, we 
believe that the issue presented by the government’s appeal to this court and Padilla’s 
appeal to the Supreme Court is of sufficient national importance as to warrant 
consideration by the Supreme Court…On an issue of such surpassing importance, we 
believe that the rule of law is best served by maintaining on appeal the status quo in 
all respects and allowing Supreme Court consideration of the case in the ordinary 
course, rather than by an eleventh hour transfer and vacutur on grounds and under 
circumstances that would further a perception that dismissal may have been sought 
for the purpose of avoiding consideration by the Supreme Court’. 
132  126 S CT 978 (Mem) 4 January 2006. 
133  See 423 F 3d 386, 391, 392, 393. 
134  See 432 F 3d 582  
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similarly reflects rule of law concerns and is set out in the US Supreme Court 
judgment of Hamdi v Rumsfeld.135   
In relation to the United Kingdom, the intelligence gathering-criminal law 
distinction again becomes relevant as the claim made regarding detention might be 
seen as misleading.136 The power of arrest, exercisable by a constable under Section 
41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK),137 is based on alleged infractions of the 
criminal law,138 not on an anticipated intelligence gathering purpose or a purely 
preventative purpose. The threshold is in fact higher in the UK than for the 
Australian questioning and detention provisions because of the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement in terrorism related activity. 
                                                 
135  Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004), 533–4: ‘We therefore hold that a citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive 
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker…At the same time, 
the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, 
enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential 
to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict‘; and at 542 US 507 
(2004), 538: ‘There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated 
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military 
tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such 
process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine 
the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner of war status under the Geneva 
Convention…In the absence of such process, however, a court that receives a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself ensure that 
the minimum requirements of due process are achieved’. 
136  “It has also been suggested that our detention regime is harsher than that in the 
United Kingdom. But this suggestion ignores the fact that in the United Kingdom 
there is a power to detain for up to seven days. That power resides with the police. 
The decision making for detention is at a lower level than the decision making in 
Australia”: Submission 102, 14. 
137  ‘A constable may arrest without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to 
be a terrorist‘: Terrorism Act 2000  (UK) s 41(1). 
138  (1) In this Part “terrorist” means a person who — (a) has committed an offence under 
any of sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63 or (b) is or has been concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. (2) The reference in 
subsection (1)(b) to a person who has been concerned in the commission, preparation 
or instigation of acts of terrorism includes a reference to a person who has been, 
whether before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism within the meaning given by section 1: 
Terrorism Act 2000  (UK) s.40(1) and (2). S.34 (a) of the Terrorism Act 2006  (UK) 
amends section 1(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11) (under which actions and 
threats designed to influence a government may be terrorism) to include after 
“government”, “or an international governmental organisation”, thereby broadening 
the scope of the arrest power. 
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Similarly, the comments on the House of Lords decision in A and others v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department139 ignores the fact that such judgments are not 
constitutionally binding in the Australian sense, with the retention of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy140 and the capacity to make a declaration of 
incompatibility of the relevant legislation with the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).141  
The system of control orders, introduced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(UK), is in fact the legislative response to the House of Lords decision — but it is 
not identified as such. In any event, comments about UK control orders as the basis 
for contesting the claim that the Australian detention and questioning regime is 
harsher than the UK are now of little relevance as the September 2005 COAG 
meeting settled upon the introduction of Australian control orders legislation.142 
Likewise, no mention is made of the capacity under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to 
indefinitely detain aliens for the purpose of removal following the 2004 decisions of 
the High Court in Al Khafaji143 and Al Kateb.144 The new Australian legislation, the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 (Cth), is in fact justified on a claimed precedence of 
the UK control orders legislation, but includes fewer and weaker safeguards and 
review mechanisms — as such, it is another confirmatory example of the practice of 
selective internationalism. 
The scope for detention under the Canadian investigative hearings mechanism is 
again similarly mistaken in the departmental approach by pressing the incorrect 
argument that ‘the suggestion that non-suspects cannot be detained is also a 
generalisation.’145 There are elisions and gaps in the language of the submission, 
                                                 
139  “Despite the opinion, it appears that a number of foreign nationals detained under the 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) remained in detention following 
the opinion” (the House of Lords judgments finding that application of the detention 
powers to foreign nationals on the basis that they were suspected international 
terrorists was a disproportionate and discriminatory response under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK)). 
140  See s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): ‘‘(1) So far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights. (2) This section — (a) applies to 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted; (b) does not affect 
the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary 
legislation; and (c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement 
of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of 
revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of that incompatibility.’ 
141  See s 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
142  See ss 104.1 to 104.32 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). 
143  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji 
(2004) 219 CLR 664. 
144  Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
145  Submission No 102, above n 99, 15. 
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suggestive, particularly to a reader without a legal background or familiarity with 
the Canadian legislation, that detention is a regular part of the Canadian 
investigative hearings mechanism.146 In reality, as has been mentioned, such 
detention in an investigative hearing is clearly only available in circumstances of 
evading service of the order, absconding, failure to attend or to remain in 
attendance.147  
Likewise, in citing the Canadian legislation, there is an incorrect conflation of the 
attendance requirements at an investigative hearing with detention.148 The 
requirement to attend and to remain in attendance149 is of a qualitatively different 
nature to custodial detention which typically involves arrest, loss of freedom of 
movement and the potential application of force to affect arrest and ensure 
continuing custody. Furthermore, the preventative arrest and recognizance 
provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code are described in a manner which fails to 
identify the linkage of anticipated criminal terrorist activity to the preventative 
arrest and recognizance provisions.150  
Following the holistic and context orientated standard advocated in the Attorney-
General’s department supplementary submission,151 it is highly appropriate to 
assess the statistical material of the use of ASIO warrants as against use of the 
Canadian investigative hearings mechanism. During ASIO’s May 2005 submission 
to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD review of the 
detention and questioning powers, it was disclosed that 8 questioning warrants had 
been used,152 with a subsequent report of a further 6 warrants, including at least 2 
                                                 
146  See the comments in the fourth paragraph of page 15 of Submission 102, above n 99 
and the comment “Mr Lenehan (of HREOC) suggested that the Canadian power to 
detain is really an ancillary power to the questioning power, and only arises if a judge 
is satisfied that the person is evading service or may not attend. We do not agree with 
this assessment…In comparison, detention under the ASIO Act is ancillary to 
questioning”: Submission 102, above n 99, 17. 
147  Criminal Code (Canada) s 83.29 and see the discussion above under the heading 
“Differentiating the purposes of the Australian legislation and overseas legislation”. 
148  Criminal Code (Canada) s 83.29. 
149  Criminal Code (Canada) s 83.28(5)(b). 
150  This is apparent from the wording of s 83.3 making explicit the linkage between 
imposition of a recognizance with conditions, arrest or detention of the person in 
custody “is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity” 
(s 83.3(2)(b)) or “is necessary in order to prevent a terrorist activity” (s 83.3(4)(b)). 
151  “[I]t is necessary to examine the whole suite of legislation that is in place and the 
surrounding circumstances, not just the particular provisions in isolation”: Attorney-
General’s Department Supplementary Submission to Review of ASIO’s questioning 
and detention powers, Submission No 102, 13. 
152  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO’s 
Questioning and Detention Powers Hansard 19 May 2005, 3–4. 
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detention warrants, being disclosed in July 2005.153 In contrast, from December 
2001 to December 2004, the Canadian Federal authorities had made no use of the 
investigative hearings power,154 and there is one identified case of a provincial 
authority155 invoking the power.156 The non-use by the Canadian Federal authorities 
of the investigative hearings mechanism over three years places the use of up to 14 
questioning warrants in Australia in the two year period from July 2003 to July 
2005 in proper perspective, calling into question the “last resort”157 claim of the 
warrants, particularly as Canada has a larger population of 32 million158 and its 
geographical proximity to the United States, a major world terrorist target.  
Alternatively, it may suggest that the real threat of terrorist activity in Australia is 
appreciably higher than in Canada — the reasons for this being open to speculation, 
particularly given the divergence of policy between the two nations over 
participation in the activities of the coalition of the willing in Iraq. In any event, the 
discrepancy of using this process between the two nations raises legitimate 
accountability questions, including the need in Australia for more detailed public 
reporting on warrants as an accountability measure.159 
                                                 
153  See Martin Chulov, ‘Suspicions focus on internal threats‘ Weekend Australian July 
30–31, 2005. The Chulov claim regarding the use of detention warrants could only 
possibly cover July 2005, as the ASIO Annual Report to Parliament states that ‘ASIO 
executed 11 questioning warrants issued in 2004–05 involving 10 people. None of 
these warrants authorised the detention of a person‘: ASIO Annual Report to 
Parliament 2004–2005, 41. The use of a further 6 warrants in 2005 was 
acknowledged by ASIO in the final hearing of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD on 8 August 2005, but observes that “By the end of the 
review, there had still been no detention warrants issued”: see Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers 
Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Canberra: Parliament of 
Commonwealth of Australia, 6. 
154  The Anti-terrorism Act — Annual Reports concerning Investigative Hearings and 
Recognizance with Conditions December 24 2001– December 23 2002; December 24 
2002 – December 23 2003 and December 24 2003 – December 23 2004. 
155  The province of British Columbia — see Re Vancouver Sun [2004] 2 SCR 332. 
156  See Re Application under s.83.28 of the Criminal Code [2004] 2 SCR 248 and a 
parallel action arising from the same matter, Re Vancouver Sun [2004] 2 SCR 332. 
157  See House of Representatives Hansard 20 March 2003, 13172 and Attorney-
General’s Press Release 21 March 2002, “ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 
Introduced”. 
158  SBS World Guide Canada — Geography at <http://www.theworldnews.com.au/ 
Worldguide/index.php3?country=37&header=3>  
159  The Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report at 96 recommended additional 
statistical information be included in the ASIO Annual Report, comprising “the 
number and length of questioning sessions within any total questioning time for each 
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G.  Advocacy of French and other systems of extended detention 
A further example of selective internationalism is found in the Attorney-General’s 
apparent advocacy of French system of extended detention in terrorism matters. 
Such advocacy arose in circumstances surrounding the 2003 deportation of French 
terror suspect, Willy Brigitte. The Attorney-General made a number of observations 
suggesting that the then recently conferred and extraordinary ASIO detention and 
questioning powers were not invoked because they were of such an inferior 
legislative nature160 to the French system that it was preferable to deport Brigitte to 
France where he would be subject to more extensive powers. 
The French counter-terrorism powers permit four days of intense questioning in 
police custody, the first three days of which is without access to a lawyer. 
Following this, years of detention can follow, during which a formal investigation is 
conducted by special anti-terrorism magistrates, with the holding charge of 
“criminal association relating to a terrorist enterprise” often used as the basis for the 
detention which is both investigative and intelligence gathering in nature.  
The French system is presented in a highly abstract manner, and reflects a strong 
selective internationalism. First, a simplistic representation of a democratically 
elected government, in this instance France, is made synonymous with suitability 
and appropriateness of counter-terrorism measures, including compliance with 
human rights.161 Second, no acknowledgment is made of, nor attempts to engage 
                                                                                                                             
warrant”, “the number of formal complaints made to the IGIS, the Ombudsman or 
appeals made to the Federal Court” and “if any, the number and nature of charges 
laid under this Act, as a result of warrants issued”. This recommendation was rejected 
by the Government: see Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
Report on the operation, effectiveness and implications of div 3 of pt III of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Government response — 
March 2006 Recommendation 18, 7. 
160  See Hon P Ruddock “Press Conference Announcing A Review of Migration 
Litigation and Answering Questions On Deportation of French National” Transcript 
27 October 2003 and “Item: Attorney-General Philip Ruddock Confirms ASIO Has 
Used Its New Powers To Interrogate Australian Associates of French Terror Suspect 
Willie Brigitte” Transcript 10 December 2003. See also ABC Television, 
‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions‘, Lateline, 27 October 2003; 
Channel Nine Network ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock‘, Sunday Program, 2 November 
2003 and ABC News Online, ‘New anti-terrorism laws too cumbersome: Ruddock‘ 
10 November 2003. 
161  ABC,Television, ‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions‘ Lateline 27 
October 2003: ‘But what you do have is an example here of broader powers that an 
intelligence agency in a developed Western country — namely France— has in 
relation to being able to detain and question people‘. See also the later citation of 
Spain by the Commonwealth Attorney General in response to a question without 
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with, systemic and significant human rights infractions identified by different 
bodies162 as occurring under the French system. 
In Tomasi v France,163 Tomasi, a French national who was a Corsican 
independence organisation member, was detained for five years and seven months 
under French anti-terrorism laws. The European Court of Human Rights found 
violations of Articles 5(3),164 3,165 and 6(1)166 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
It should also be noted that the real and potential abuses within the French system 
of the investigation of terrorism suspects are enabled as the broader counter-
terrorism powers and discretions are superimposed upon the French criminal 
                                                                                                                             
notice: ‘In Spain they can hold people incommunicado for 13 days but for up to four 
years in pre-trial detention if required‘: House of Representatives Hansard 1 
November 2005, 7. Spain was severely criticised for its practice of incommunicado 
detention in terrorism cases and torture arising therein in the 2004 report of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the question of Torture. See Civil and Political Rights, 
Including the Question of Torture and Detention Addendum Visit to Spain UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2 6 February 2004, esp 17–20 Conclusions and 21–22 
Recommendations. 
162  These bodies include the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Committee Against Torture. See 
also Amnesty International Report 2001: France. 
163  Case Number 27/1991/279/350 European Court of Human Rights [1992] ECHR 53 
(27 August 1992).. 
164  Article 5(3) European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: ‘Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the 
provisions of para 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial’. 
165  Article 3 of the European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms : ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’. 
166  Article 6(1) of the European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced quickly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security 
in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion 
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice’. 
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investigative system, itself the subject of serious breaches167 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Furthermore, evidence of human rights abuses in 
France’s counter-terrorism detention laws has been found by United Nations human 
rights treaty body committees.168 
Advocating features of the French counter-terrorism detention powers is a striking 
variant of selective internationalism. The risks and abuses found within the system 
by respected bodies have simply been ignored, with the system of lengthy detention 
presented advantageously, as a model suggestive and supportive of further 
liberalisation of executive power inherent in the Australian detention and 
questioning provisions. At the same time, attention was drawn away from a 
potentially politically damaging domestic administrative issue.169 
                                                 
167  See Selmouni v France European Court of Human Rights Application No 25806/94 
28 July 1999 [1999] ECHR 66.. 
168  See Human Rights Committee: Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document CCPR/C/79/Add.80; Committee 
Against Torture: Summary record of the public part of the 323rd meeting: France 11 
May 1998 UN Document CAT/C/SR.323 D; Concluding observations of the 
Committee against Torture: France 27 May 1998 UN Document A/53/44; Arana v 
France Committee Against Torture Communication No 63/1997. For a more recent 
example of such breaches, see the findings of the Committee Against Torture in 
Brada v France Communication No 195/2002 UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/195/2002 
(2005). In para 13.4, the Committee found that the expulsion of the applicant from 
France to Algeria ‘nullified the effective exercise of the right to complaint conferred 
by article 22 and has rendered the Committee’s final decision on the merits futile and 
devoid of object. The Committee thus concludes that in expelling the complainant in 
the circumstances that it did the State party breached its obligations under article 22 
of the Convention’. In paras 13.5 and 13.6, the Committee also observed ‘that the 
Bordeaux Administrative Court of Appeal, following the complainant’s expulsion, 
found upon consideration of the evidence presented, that the complainant was at risk 
of treatment in breach of article 3 of the European Convention, a finding which 
would encompass torture…As a result, the Committee also concludes that the 
complainant has established that his removal was in breach of article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’. 
169  French intelligence had alerted Australian authorities on 22 September 2003 that 
Brigitte had reportedly participated in terrorist training and again, having received no 
response, on 3 October 2003 indicating that he may be in Australia for terrorism 
related activity and that he was possibly dangerous. That communication was not 
acted upon by ASIO until 7 October 2003, the communications area having closed 
for an intervening long weekend public holiday: See Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee Estimates, Hansard, 16 February 2004, 4–5 concerning the receipt dates 
of the various communications from the French authorities to ASIO and House of 
Representatives Hansard 3 November 2003, 21727. 
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The development of new detention measures following the COAG terrorism 
summit of 27 September 2005 has unsurprisingly invoked characteristics of 
selective internationalism — in adopting the control orders regime from the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) and in purporting to follow, for 
preventative detention purposes, the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), in the agreement 
with the states for state legislation to provide for 14 days of preventative detention. 
Already, the s 41 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) minimum criminal law criterion of 
reasonable suspicion of being concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism to enable such detention, with judicial review after 
48 hours, has not been considered as the appropriate reference point for Australian 
legislation. The final form of Anti-Terrorism Act (No .2) 2005 (Cth), whilst 
promoted and reassured through suggested derivation from the UK legislation,170 
confer similar powers, but without quite the array of checks and balances properly 
commensurate with such legislation.171 
H.  Failure to include adequate exemptions for the provision and communication of 
legal advice or for legal representation in relation to the s 102.8 Commonwealth 
Criminal Code offence of Associating with terrorist organisations, introduced by 
the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth) 
Another form of selective internationalism associated with the questioning and 
detention powers is the apparent failure to provide comprehensive exemptions for 
the provision of legal advice and legal representation for pursuing legal redress in 
international forums, in the context of associating with terrorist organisations 
offence. The quite specific nature of this example, as against the broader concerns 
of examples canvassed so far, illustrates the consistency and versatility of the 
                                                 
170  See Prime Minister’s Media Release “Counter-Terrorism Laws Strengthened” 8 
September 2005: ‘States and Territories will be asked to provide for longer detention 
periods, similar to those available in the UK which allow for up to 14 days detention, 
because there are constitutional restrictions on the capacity of the Australian 
Government to provide for this type of detention‘ and “Transcript of Prime Minister 
The Hon John Howard MP Joint Press Conference With Attorney General Parliament 
House Canberra” 8 September 2005, Attorney General: ‘Can I just say in relation to 
the control orders, when I hear comments that suggest that this is somewhat akin to 
what you might expect in a police state that it’s modelled upon the provisions in the 
United Kingdom. So you know, you’re looking at countries that observe the rule of 
law of democratic institutions and were certainly not accused of being a police state 
when those laws were enacted there’. 
171  See “Government Enhances Anti-Terror Bill” Attorney-General’s Media Release 1 
December 2005 in contrast to the 52 recommendations in the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee report Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 
(No 2) 2005 Canberra: The Senate, November 2005, ix–xvi. 
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selective internationalism approach, emerging as it has with both narrower and 
broader topics. 
Section 102.8 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code creates an offence for 
associating with terrorist organisations. A series of exemptions from the offence are 
provided,172 for which the defendant must bear an evidential burden,173 including 
association only for the purpose of providing legal advice or legal representation in 
connection with…(iii) a decision made or proposed to be made under Division 3 of 
Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), or proceedings relating to such a decision or 
proposed decision,174 namely the ASIO detention and questioning powers. 
It is uncertain whether “proceedings” relating to a decision or  proposed decision 
under the questioning and detention powers under Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO 
Act 1979 (Cth) would extend to a range of internationally oriented legal and quasi-
legal mechanisms. This issue was highlighted in a submission to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 
2) 2004 (Cth).175 A number of categories of the giving of legal advice relating to 
international legal remedies were not included in the final version of the 
legislation.176  
Accordingly, the exclusion of these forms of communication for the provision of 
legal advice and legal representation arguably fall within the s 102.8 Criminal Code 
association with terrorist organisations offence. These are communications from 
Australia to overseas for the purpose of providing legal advice or legal 
representation (for the following purposes not included in s 102.8 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code): 
. In relation to proceedings before US courts to test the legality of detention 
and military commission trials following the US Supreme Court decisions in 
Hamdi177 and Padilla178 (as matters stood at the time of the passage of the 
s.102.8 Criminal Code offence) and subsequently, in relation to any changes 
                                                 
172  Commonwealth Criminal Code s 102.8 (4). 
173  See note to Commonwealth Criminal Code s 102.8(4): “A defendant bears an 
evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (4)”. 
174  Commonwealth Criminal Code s 102.8(4).  
175  Submission 87 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry 
into Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2004. 
176  Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth). 
177  Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004). 
178   Padilla v Rumsfeld 542 US 426 (2004). 
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negotiated by the US Executive with Congress to the military commissions 
process following the US Supreme Court decision in Hamdan179 in 2006.180 
. In relation to other proceedings, civil and criminal, in other foreign (ie non-
US) courts or tribunals. 
. Communications relating to exploring possible invocation of proceedings by 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in relation to 
war crimes or crimes against humanity arising from detention overseas or in a 
failure or unwillingness to domestically invoke the relevant ICC provisions in 
the Criminal Code (Cth) (Chapter 8, Subdivision C and Subdivision D) for 
alleged offences committed overseas or in Australia but within the 
jurisdictional ambit of the Australian statute. 
. Individual communications (complaints) under the optional protocol or other 
processes before the United Nations treaty system committees, that is the 
Human Rights Committee (ICCPR), Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee Against Torture (CAT). 
I.  The role of a sunset clause in periodic review of the detention and questioning 
powers 
A further issue of selective internationalism arises in relation to the sunset clause 
provision of the detention and questioning powers,181 and the then requirement for 
review of Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth).182 This issue emerged 
in the May and June 2005 Joint Parliamentary Committee hearings reviewing the 
legislation, where firm opposition to continuing the presence of a sunset clause in a 
renewal of the legislation was made by the Attorney-General’s department and 
                                                 
179  Hamdan v Rumsfeld (29 June 2006).2006 US LEXIS 5185 
180      See, for example, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 s.3960. See also the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 42 USCS 2000dd 
181  Formerly s 34Y of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), now s 34ZZ of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). 
182  Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bb) to review, by 22 January 2006, the 
operation, effectiveness and implications of: (i) div 3 of pt III of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979; and (ii) the amendments made by the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2003, except item 24 of sch 1 to that Act (which included div 3 of pt III in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979); and (c) to report the 
Committee’s comments and recommendations to each House of the Parliament and to 
the responsible Minister. Section 29(1)(bb) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 
(Cth) was amended by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) and now 
requires that the Committee “review, by 22 January 2016, the operation, effectiveness 
and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979”. 
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ASIO. That opposition was confirmed in the official Government response of 
March 2006 to the Joint Parliamentary Committee report.183 
Such opposition is best considered and understood in its context. That context is 
provided first, by the exceptional nature of the detention and questioning powers — 
a point canvassed, in comparative jurisdictional terms184 elsewhere, but for present 
purposes, mentioned directly in terms of exceptionality and last resort. Secondly, 
context is also provided by relevant legislative examples in the UK and Canada 
where a sunset clause and review mechanism have been included as necessary 
safeguards. 
It would seem as a matter of logic and consistency that powers recognised as 
exceptional deserve additional safeguards for executive accountability and public 
reassurance. The detention and questioning powers have been consistently 
acknowledged as of a special character, often described as powers of last resort. The 
last resort characterisation first arose in circumstances leading up to the passage of 
the legislation. Attorney-General Williams emphasised this aspect,185 whilst the 
Attorney-General’s department also argued the exceptionality of the “last resort” 
application of detention warrants.186  It more recently arose in evidence before the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee Review of ASIO’s questioning and detention 
powers.187  
However, from a government perspective, there is little or no connection between 
that exceptionality and the desirability of a sunset clause as a further safeguard. At 
the passage of the legislation, the sunset clause was simply included as part of a 
compromise,188 following earlier, strident opposition to its inclusion.189 At the 
                                                 
183  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Report on the 
operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Government response — March 2006, 
Recommendation 19, 7–8. 
184  See the discussion above under sub-headings following the heading “Dealing with 
and responding to overseas legislation”.  
185  See Hon D Williams House of Representatives Hansard 20 March 2003, 13172, 
Attorney-General’s Press Release 21 March 2002 “ASIO Legislation Amendment 
Bill Introduced” and 26 June 2003 “Final Passage of ASIO Powers Legislation”. 
Attorney General Ruddock has also invoked the last resort claim: See A-G’s Media 
Release “ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Regime To Continue” 15 June 2006. 
186  See Senate Constitutional and Legal References Committee Hansard 18 November 
2002, 110 and 125. 
187  See Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 19 May 2005, 
3, 6, 8 and 21. See also discussion in the Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report 
at 104–7. 
188  See Attorney-General’s Media Release ‘Compromise For The Sake Of National 
Security’’’ 11 June 2003:‘‘ ‘These (amendments) are in addition to the substantial 
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review of the legislation, continued inclusion of a sunset clause was strongly 
objected to by the Attorney-General’s department for a variety of reasons.190  
The departmental reasons advocating removal of the sunset clause were extensive 
and carefully cultivated. They included that the ‘current national security and 
counter-terrorism environment justifies the continued need for the powers and that 
the sunset clause should be removed’;191 that the “inflexible nature” of the sunset 
clause means that the expiration of the legislation could coincide with a time of 
national crisis;192 that reviews accompanying sunset clauses are resource intensive, 
diverting resources from protecting the Australian community to the review and re-
enactment of legislation to avoid the lapsing;193 and some extraordinary claims 
intended to diminish the significance of the sunset clause, which ignore its 
restraining influence on agency culture and the qualitative difference for review 
when it is underpinned by the reality of the legislation’s prospective expiration: 
There is really no magic in a sunset clause. If there is any concern about the 
operation of the legislation (which may become evident through parliamentary 
committee reviews, reports or inquiries by the IGIS, or through other means) 
or if it becomes clear that the powers are no longer required (for example, 
through continual parliamentary committee reports that the powers have not 
been used and appear to be no longer necessary), then the Parliament can 
change or remove the legislation. This would achieve the objective of 
changing or removing the powers if the threat environment changes and the 
powers are no longer needed, but (as the then Director-General of Security 
noted) without the artificiality and difficulties that may be caused by an 
arbitrary time limit imposed by a sunset provision.194   
Clearly, the tenor of this claim — exemplified by the implicit, unrealistic role of a 
neutral, non-partisan, responsive Parliament — would further concentrate executive 
                                                                                                                             
number of amendments that we have already agreed to in an effort to secure passage 
of the Bill, including that the bill will sunset in three years time’. 
189  See Attorney-General’s, Media Release ‘Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill House Message’‘’12 
December 2002: ‘‘‘The Government has repeatedly stated that a sunset clause is not 
appropriate. We are moving amendments to remove the sunset clause inserted by the 
Opposition in the Senate’. 
190  Indeed, removal of the sunset clause was listed as ‘7. Key recommendation — 
removal of sunset provision‘ in the Attorney-General’s Department submission to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD review of ASIO’s 
questioning and detention powers. 
191  ’Submission 102, above n 99, 10. 
192  ’Submission 102, above n 99, 10. 
193  Submission 102, above n 99, ’10. 
194  Submission 102, above n 99, 11.’  
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power and remove one of a limited number of effective accountability measures. It 
completely discounted the dynamics of effective, substantive review tied to a fixed 
expiration of the legislation, which actually expresses its exceptionality. 
These attitudes and approaches produced suggestions which may be described as 
Australianised review alternatives, premised upon removal of the sunset clause.  
Such alternatives are wholly inadequate given the exceptionality and reach of the 
powers. They place a disproportionate trust in the influence of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security over an executive with little interest 
in implementing effective accountability mechanisms.195 
Whilst elsewhere international comparative examples have been engaged and 
responded to in pursuing concentrations of such powers, in this instance there was 
no such engagement, because to do so would encounter recent examples where the 
utility of a sunset clause has been endorsed. 
The Criminal Code (Canada) limits the operation of the investigative hearing 
mechanism to terms of five years duration, unless specifically renewed by the 
Parliament. As previously discussed, Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Canada) 
provides for an investigative hearing for the purposes of the gathering of 
information for the purposes of an investigation of a terrorism offence. Under s..  
83.32, s.83.28 (as well as ss 83.29 and 83.3) of the Criminal Code (Canada) cease 
to apply at the end of the fifteenth sitting day after December 31, 2006 ‘unless, 
before the end of that day, the application of those sections is extended by a 
resolution — the text of which is established under subsection (2) — passed by both 
Houses of Parliament in accordance with the rules set out in subsection (3)’. 
Subsection (2) of s 83.32 of the Criminal Code states: 
The Governor-General in Council may, by order, establish the text of a 
resolution providing for the extension of the application of sections 83.28, 
83.29 and 83.3 and specifying the period of the extension, which may not 
exceed five years from the first day on which the resolution has been acceded 
to by both Houses of Parliament. 
Subsection (4) of s 83.32 of the Criminal Code states: 
                                                 
195  The Joint Parliamentary Committee itself found ‘arguments in favour of retaining the 
sunset clause the more compelling…The debate on the legislation will necessarily be 
more extensive if it must go through a Committee review, such as the current one, 
and then be debated as legislation in the chambers of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. Only a sunset clause will achieve this. Anything else is potentially 
academic or indefinitely deferrable‘: Joint Parliamentary Committee 2005 Report, 
106–7. 
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The application of sections 83.28, 83.29 and 83.3 may be further extended in 
accordance with the procedure set out in this section, with the words 
“December 31, 2006” in subsection (1) read as “the expiration of the most 
recent extension under this section”. 
Accordingly, the Canadian legislation — at its most expansive point equivalent to 
an Australian questioning only warrant — includes a sunset clause specifically 
requiring reinstatement of the provisions every five years. 
In the United Kingdom, the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) was implemented as 
permanent counter-terrorism legislation, replacing periodically renewed legislation 
that contained a sunset clause,196 as well as removing a derogation from the 
European Convention of Human Rights,197 the derogation having been made 
following an adverse finding against the UK in the European Court of Human 
Rights.198  
                                                 
196  See J J Rowe, ‘The Terrorism Act 2000‘ [2001] Criminal Law Review 527, 527. The 
preceding legislation was the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1989 (UK) and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (UK). 
197  The derogation from Article 5(3) was removed on February 19, 2001: See per Lord 
Bassam of Brighton in House of Lords debate vol 611, col 1432 ‘In order to 
withdraw those derogations, the Bill provides a system for extensions of detention 
under independent judicial authority. The Government intends to lift the derogations 
once those provisions are in force‘. The Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) bore on its face the 
Minister’s statement of compatibility with the Convention, in conformity with 
s 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
198  In 1988, following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Brogan 
and Others v United Kingdom, where the Court found a violation of Articles 5(3) and 
5(5) of the European Convention of Human Rights, the UK notified a derogation for 
Article 5(3) in relation to terrorism powers applying to Northern Ireland enabling 
further detention for up to 5 days upon authority of the Secretary of State. Schedule 3 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) contains the 1988 notification of the derogation 
to the Council of Europe ‘to ensure compliance with the obligations of Her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom of the Convention‘, stating ‘Since the judgment 
of 29 November 1988 as well as previously, the Government have found it necessary 
to continue to exercise, in relation to terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern 
Ireland, the powers described above enabling further detention without charge for 
periods of up to 5 days, on the authority of the Secretary of State, to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation to enable necessary enquiries and 
investigations properly to be completed in order to decide whether criminal 
proceedings should be instituted. To the extent that the exercise of these powers may 
be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by the Convention the Government has 
availed itself of the right of derogation by Article 15(1) of the Convention and will 
continue to do so until further notice‘. In Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, 
(2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 49
The relevant section of the 2005 enacted legislation dealing with control orders, 
section 13(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) provides that ‘Except 
so far as otherwise provided under this section, sections 1 to 9 (dealing with control 
orders) expire at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on 
which this Act is passed’. Section 13(2) allows the Home Secretary to make an 
order by statutory instrument enabling revival of sections 1 to 9 for a period not 
exceeding one year or for the sections to continue in force from the time they would 
otherwise expire for a period not exceeding one year. Section 13(4) requires that the 
making of a section 13(2) order by the Home Secretary must be preceded by a draft 
being laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. 
The relevance of this UK experience for present consideration of ASIO’s 
questioning and detention powers is the insistence and eventual inclusion of a 
sunset clause in the UK legislation controlling movement, contacts and conduct, 
providing a linkage through reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism 
related activity. Furthermore, that legislation is not expanded to include innocent 
persons who may be thought to have information relevant to a terrorism offence. 
The omission of discussion about the UK sunset clause from the present review can 
be seen as a further example of selective internationalism. That view is reinforced 
by developments from the September 2005 COAG Terrorism summit, where 
Federal, State and Territory leaders agreed to the introduction of control orders and 
preventative detention199 — with a review to be conducted by COAG itself after 
five years200 and a sunset clause of 10 years.201 Strikingly absent from Government 
advocacy are the time limits and review instituted in the comparable UK control 
orders legislation, which itself only arose because of the declared inconsistency by 
the House of Lords of indefinite detention of suspected international terrorists under 
the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), a difficulty which 
comparably would not arise in relation to constitutional aliens under the Migration 
                                                                                                                             
the European Court of Human Rights found that the derogation of Article 5(3) 
satisfied the requirement of Article 15 on the basis of a public emergency. 
199  Now enacted as div 104 and div 105 of the Criminal Code (Cth) by the Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). 
200  Reflected in s 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). 
201  Council of Australian Governments Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 27 
September 2005 Communique. Section 104.32 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
(Cth) specifies that (1) A control order that is in force at the end of 10 years after the 
day on which this Division commences ceases to be in force at that time (and) (2) A 
control order cannot be requested, made or confirmed after the end of 10 years after 
the day on which this Division commences. Section 105.53 provides a ten year sunset 
clause in similar terms to section 104.32 for preventative detention orders and 
prohibited contact orders. 
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Act 1958 (Cth) powers, following the High Court’s decisions in Al Kateb202 and Al 
Khafaji.203 
In further articulating this Australianised approach, the Attorney-General 
announced204 that the five year sunset clause and review period recommended by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry into ASIO’s Questioning and Detention 
Powers205 would not be adopted. Instead, a 10 year review period and sunset clause 
would be enacted,206 justified on the dual basis of consistency with the 10 year 
sunset clause for preventative detention legislation agreed at COAG and because 
‘recent experience with statutory reviews has demonstrated that they are resource 
intensive and do have an impact on operational priorities’.207 The continuation of 
the questioning and detention powers for the next decade was confirmed with the 
passage of the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) on 13 June 2006.208 
In a similar manner, whilst UK legislation209 has been cited as the precedent and 
model for Australian preventive detention, the UK legislation continues to provide a 
higher criminal threshold than what is envisaged under the Australian legislation.210 
Significantly, the form of legislation extending preventative detention up to 14 
days, as agreed by the States and Territories, for constitutional reasons211 is 
                                                 
202  Al-Kateb v Godwin and Others (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
203  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji 219 
CLR 664. 
204  See House of Representatives Hansard 29 March 2006, 4–5 and Attorney-General’s 
News Release 29 March 2006 “ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Regime To 
Continue”. 
205   ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers Review of the operation, effectiveness and 
implications of Division 3 of Part III in the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and 
DSD, 102–8, recommendation 19, 108. 
206  See House of Representatives Hansard  29 March 2006, 4–5 and Items 32 and 33, 
sch 2 ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth). 
207  House of Representatives Hansard 29 March 2006, 4. 
208  See A-G’s Media Release “ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Regime To Continue” 
15 June 2006. The Assent date for the legislation was 19 June 2006. See also s.34ZZ 
of the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) : “ This Division ceases to have 
effect on 22 July 2016”. 
209  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) ss 40 and 41. 
210  ‘In relation to preventative detention orders COAG noted…the AFP must have 
reasonable grounds that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a 
terrorist attack or, where a terrorist act has occurred, preserve evidence‘: Council of 
Australian Governments Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 27 September 2005 
Communique 
211  ‘State and Territory leaders agreed to enact legislation to give effect to measures 
which, because of constitutional constraints, the Commonwealth could not enact, 
including preventative detention for up to 14 days‘: Council of Australian 
(2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 51
potentially open to a still broader threshold.212 In another sense, it can also be 
argued that comparisons with the UK and the need for preventative detention are 
further misleading in that the existing ASIO detention powers language forms a 
preventative purpose213 and that the ASIO powers have been previously 
characterised elsewhere as preventative in nature.214 Indeed, the preventative 
language associated with the then proposed ASIO detention powers in 2001 
strongly suggests that the 2005 Australian preventative detention reforms are 
                                                                                                                             
Governments Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 27 September 2005 
Communique. 
212  As evidenced in the language of the Communique, which is Commonwealth-specific: 
‘The NCTC will settle the amendments to the Commonwealth Criminal Code by the 
end of October 2005 and consider options for harmonising State and Territory 
legislative provisions‘ and the fact that the attachment to the communiqué refers only 
to the AFP and proceeds on the assumption of a Chapter III separation of powers as 
applying to the Commonwealth: ‘the AFP must have reasonable grounds that making 
the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist attack or, where a 
terrorist act has occurred, preserve evidence…an AFP officer could issue an order for 
an initial 24 hours; that period could be extended by an issuing authority for a further 
24 hours only; the total detention period allowable would be a maximum of 48 hours; 
an issuing authority would be a Magistrate or Judge who agrees to act as an issuing 
authority in their personal capacity’. 
213  See s 34F(4)(d) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) (request for questioning and detention 
warrant): ‘that there are reasonable grounds for believing that, if the person is not 
immediately taken into custody and detained, the person: (i) may alert a person 
involved in a terrorism offence that the offence is being investigated; or (ii) may not 
appear before the prescribed authority; or (iii) may destroy, damage or alter a record 
or thing the person may be requested in accordance with the warrant to produce’. 
214  See Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related 
matters 77–78 under the headings “Protective detention” and “Preventive detention”. 
See also Attorney-General’s Media release “New Counter-Terrorism Measures” 2 
October 2000: “Such action only would be authorised where the magistrate or 
tribunal member was satisfied it was necessary in order to protect the public from 
politically motivated violence”; ABC Television, ‘A-G defends new anti-terrorism 
laws’, “ Lateline, 27 November 2001; and Enclosure: Report of Australia to the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to 
Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 10, 
UN Doc S/2001/1247 (2001) — the power of detention referred to is ‘for up to 48 
hours without legal representation in very serious cases where such a step is 
necessary to prevent a terrorist attack‘. Interestingly, the evidence-preservation aspect 
in s 34F(4)(d)(iii) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) also appears as a justification following 
the September 2005 COAG terrorism summit: “In relation to preventative detention 
orders COAG noted “the AFP must have reasonable grounds that making the order 
would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist attack or, where a terrorist act has 
occurred, preserve evidence.” 
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reclamations or expansions of that existing concept, inappropriately mobilising215 
the example of the UK legislation as comparative justification, and conferring those 
powers on police agencies rather than ASIO.216 Such a hypothesis is entirely 
consistent with widely and publicly expressed government frustration217 of not 
obtaining the scope of ASIO powers, absent the inclusion of current safeguards,218 
which it had sought in 2002–2003.  
J.  Asserted compliance with international human rights obligations and the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 
Another intersection of the questioning and detention powers with international 
comparative examples arises in situations where it has been asserted that the 
legislation complies with international human rights obligations. The Attorney-
General’s department’s response to this issue has been to consistently assert full 
compliance of the legislation with such obligations. 
A most obvious instance arose early on in relation to the meaning of then clause 34 
J of the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) requiring humane 
treatment of detainees.219 It was seen as sufficient in the original versions of the bill 
                                                 
215  On the basis that whilst it can be said that the UK provisions have a preventative 
element, the threshold test in ss 40 and 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) of concern 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism and the structure of 
the legislation leading to investigation, charge or release. See also Annex A “Pre-
Charge Detention Periods” of letter of UK Home Secretary dated 15 September 2005 
regarding the Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK) to Conservative and Liberal Democrats 
spokespersons on home affairs, which uses the phrase “early preventative arrest” but 
goes on to state that ‘The aim must always be to ensure that a person is charged with 
an appropriate offence‘ and ‘why it may not be possible to gather all the evidence in 
the time currently available in terrorist cases‘.   
216  Indeed, the major conceptual difference between the ASIO detention powers and the 
AFP detention powers appears that ‘a person detained could not be questioned except 
to confirm their identity‘: Council of Australian Governments Special Meeting on 
Counter-Terrorism 27 September 2005 Attachment. 
217  See Attorney-General’s Media Releases, ‘Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill House Message‘  13 
December 2002); ‘Compromise For The Sake Of National Security‘ 11 June 2003) 
and ‘Final Passage of ASIO Powers Legislation‘  26 June 2003). 
218  As evidenced in a comparison between the original version of the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, introduced into the House of Representatives on 
21 March 2002, and the final version of the bill, passed on 26 June 2003. 
219  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34T(2): ‘The person must be treated with humanity and 
with respect for human dignity, and must not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, by anyone exercising authority under the warrant or 
implementing or enforcing the direction’. 
(2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 53
to have a statement of the requirement of humane treatment, without penalties for 
breach and without a protocol to guide the operation of detention and questioning 
warrants.220 
Likewise, the requirements for drafting the protocol itself221 included no specific 
reference to the ICCPR articles or General Comments on those articles, nor require 
consultation with the Commonwealth Human Rights Commissioner or other 
competent human rights authority in its preparation.222 All that was additionally 
indicated was that ‘ASIO, together with the Australian Federal Police and the 
Attorney-General’s Department have been working on the Protocol…Relevant 
standards, including United Nations Rules in relation to detained persons, have been 
taken into account in preparing the document’.223 
Similarly, it was seen as a sufficient response to a question about the meaning of 
“humanely” in the provision, to explain the word in general terms deriving from 
                                                 
220  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 30 April 
2002, 40–41. See also original version of ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Bill 2002 (Cth), introduced into the House of Representatives on 21 March 2002, cl 
34J(2): ‘The person must be treated with humanity and respect for human dignity, 
and must not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, by anyone 
exercising authority under the warrant or implementing or enforcing the direction’. 
221  Formerly ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C (3A), now s 34C ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). See also 
sch 1 pt 3 Item 20 Transitional — existing Protocol of the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). 
222  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C(3A) stated: ‘The adopting acts in relation to a written 
statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under warrants 
issued under 34D are as follows: (a) consultation of the following persons by the 
Director-General about making such a statement : (i) consultation of the following 
persons by the Director-General about making such a statement (i) the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security; (ii) the Commissioner of Police appointed under 
the Australian Federal Police Act 1979; (b) making of the statement by the Director-
General after that consultation; (c) approval of the statement by the Minister; (d) 
presentation of the statement to each House of the Parliament; (e) briefing (in writing 
or orally) the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (whether 
before or after presentation of the statement to each House of the Parliament‘.  
A similar procedure has been adopted in the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth): see s 34C(1)–(6) of the Act, the major difference being that the statement 
prepared by the Director General and approved by the Minister is a legislative 
instrument made by the Minister on the day on which the statement is approved, with 
the Director required to brief the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the statement 
after it si approved by the Minister. 
223  Attorney-General’s,Media Release ‘ASIO Protocol To Guide Warrant Process’,12 
August 2003 . 
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international conventions,224 rather than more precisely identifying its origins in 
Articles 7 and 10 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and 
refining its meaning by definition and exposition in the legislation by drawing upon 
the communications determined by the Human Rights Committee on these Articles, 
as well as the General Comments on the Articles.225 It was asserted shortly 
thereafter that, contrary to various submissions received by the Committee, none of 
the provisions of the legislation breached Australia’s obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.226  
At the later Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee hearings, the 
genesis for the detention and questioning powers was seen as UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373.227 However, subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions 
building upon Security Council Resolution 1373 have cautioned the need to 
implement counter-terrorism measures in a manner that respects international law, 
in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.228 Such 
statements now have to be read in conjunction with Security Council Resolution 
1373. 
Australian legislative practice and implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 has not been consistently and identifiably linked with the 
introduction of the detention and questioning powers.229 Furthermore, various other 
UN human rights bodies have emphasised the need to implement counter-terrorism 
obligations and measures in a manner consistent with human rights — such as the 
                                                 
224  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 30 April 
2002, 41: ‘It may be possible to add that this provision derives in part from 
provisions of a number of international conventions that deal with human 
rights…The question of what is or what is not humane will depend to some extent on 
the context. The decisions of the various committees that look at those conventions 
bear that out’. 
225  Namely, General Comment 20 on Article 7 and General Comment 21 on Article 10. 
226  Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 30 April 2002, 49. 
227  See Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 12 November 
2002, 2: ‘The United Nations in resolution 1373 set the parameters of the new 
approach that countries around the world took to this problem. While not divorcing 
itself from the approach of punishing and prosecuting terrorists, there was a new 
focus on ways to prevent terrorism in the first place. Most of the material in 
resolution 1373 deals with that new approach’. 
228  See SC Resolution 1456 (2003) para 6 and SC Resolution 1566 (2004) preamble. 
229  See Greg Carne, ‘Detaining Questions or Compromising Constitutionality? The 
ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth)” (2004) 27 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 524, 536–45. 
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Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,230 the 
Commission on Human Rights,231 and the High Commissioner of Human Rights232 
Later responses, both at the Parliamentary Committee stage233 and in a written 
submission234 continue the approach of a brief, asserted, but unsubstantiated 
compliance of detention and questioning provisions with international human rights 
obligations. In total, this particular interaction of the detention and questioning 
powers provides an additional dimension of selective internationalism — a failure 
to expound and justify how these provisions fully comply with both international 
obligations and international human rights obligations — its selectivity 
                                                 
230  Terrorism and human rights Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/21, 
2: ‘all measures to counter terrorism must be in strict conformity with international 
law, including international human rights and humanitarian law standards and 
obligations’. 
231  Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/80, 2: ‘that States must ensure that any measures 
taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international 
law…that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms recognized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights without distinction of any kind‘ and Report 
of The Independent Expert On The Protection of Human Rights And Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (submitted in accordance with Commission 
on Human Rights resolution 2004/87), 6: ‘Success in the struggle against terrorism, 
however will require the international community not just to respond to its violent 
consequences, but to uphold the rule of law in combating it’. 
232  Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 4: ‘the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Louise Arbour, has stressed her view that counter-terrorism measures, 
whilst both urgent and necessary, must be taken within a context of strict respect for 
human rights obligations’. 
233  See Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Hansard 19 May 2005, 
5: ‘The second area of concern is to do with our human rights obligations. The 
comments about them are quite similar to some of the comments that were made 
when the legislation was first put together. I can assure you that our department has 
examined these points again, these submissions, and we do not believe that this 
legislation is inconsistent with those human rights obligations…It is not arbitrary and 
so much of its focus is about ensuring that there are reasonable limitations to it’. 
234  See Submission No 102 (Attorney-General’s Department supplementary submission) 
to Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Review of ASIO’s 
questioning and detention powers at 23: ‘Many submissions and witnesses have 
referred to international human rights obligations and suggested that our legislation is 
deficient in this regard. There does not appear to have been anything new on this 
issue raised in the hearings, and our view remains as set out in our opening statement 
to the Committee on 19 May 2005’. 
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characterised through the omission of a great deal of material that needs to be 
addressed and explained.235 
This further variant of selective internationalism, the asserted compliance of the 
detention and questioning powers with international law and human rights 
obligations, lacking in public substantiation, perhaps is part of a broader selective 
culture in Australian counter-terrorism measures — one that fails to integrate 
human rights mechanisms and expertise in counter-terrorism policy and procedural 
activity. In fact, there is a marked disconnection of international human rights 
framework from the formulation of the detention and questioning powers. The 
compliance as exists is likely to have been produced coincidentally by ad hoc 
amendments, rather than as a systematic method of drafting compliance. A 
significant example of these phenomena arise again in the further acquisition of 
preventative detention powers under the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth). 
V.  CONCLUSION   
The Australianisation of international comparative examples in developing a 
counter-terrorism ASIO questioning and detention regime has many dimensions and 
characteristics. The range of examples canvassed in this article demonstrates how 
the development of Australian detention and questioning powers has taken on a 
unique format, by interacting with and engaging international examples and 
approaches to encourage and produce executive-orientated Australian legislative 
objectives and consequences. This process has been identified and described as one 
of selective internationalism. The consistency and variety of its manifestations 
strongly suggest that it is a deliberate, overarching executive and legislative 
approach to the introduction and development of controversial intelligence 
gathering questioning and detention laws. 
The objectives and consequences of selective internationalism include accretions of 
executive power, an expansion and reliance upon executive discretion, a constant 
re-working and re-visiting of legislative provisions to expand power with increasing 
demands that such amendments be speedily enacted, as well as a deliberate 
diminution or exclusion of international human rights safeguards for the Australian 
questioning and detention provisions.  
It is both instructive and appropriate to see the Australianisation process regarding 
the detention and questioning powers legislation as located within and drawing 
upon some broader developments. Under the heading ‘Examining Individual and 
                                                 
235  International standards were referred to in submissions opposing the legislation and 
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Community Rights’,236 the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s department 
observed: 
The second area requiring attention over the next couple of years is an 
examination of our understanding of individual and community rights in the 
21st century…things are a bit different now. Australia and Australians have 
been nominated as terrorist targets. We have to ensure that we take all the 
steps necessary to protect the safety of our community as a whole and, in the 
process, to protect the rights of individuals within our society…I do not see 
these moves as an infringement of individual rights. I see them as reflecting 
the extent to which we, as a society, agree that our individual rights fit within 
the overall interests of the Australian community as a whole in a more 
dangerous world. 
These statements, made by the head of the department sponsoring and responsible 
for the questioning and detention powers, signal a public justification of 
concentrating executive power under the mantle of counter-terrorism. The 
community rights reference is really advocating a state-centric security approach, 
tending towards a decidedly more formalist or guided democracy model, claiming 
and reconstituting individual protection through protection of the community. The 
product of such a model is a likely marginalisation or neutralisation of individual 
type human rights content in legislation. This view coincides with and reinforces 
the Australianisation process in relation to the international comparative examples. 
A further significant international context within which the detention and 
questioning powers can be more readily comprehended is the more extensive 
attempt by the United States administration to construct an intelligence gathering 
detention regime237 — one essentially where the suspect — non-suspect distinction 
is rendered largely irrelevant and the principle of prolonged detention, during which 
accepted human rights principles are severely curtailed or excluded, is normalised. 
These later characteristics have to a smaller degree been borrowed and adapted for 
the Australian model and instituted within a legislative framework. 
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This development represents a fundamental re-alignment, so that everyone is a 
potential source of intelligence and subject to detention. The character and practical 
effects of the loss of liberty associated with detention are seen as unremarkable and 
unproblematic,238 as they are being pursued for a nominally preventative, pre-
emptive and\or intelligence gathering purpose. Its milder characteristics and 
assumptions — such as incommunicado detention and a focus upon the individual 
as a potential human information source, rather than a subject of reasonable 
suspicion, culpability or guilt — are found in the Australian detention and 
questioning provisions. Likewise, the model sees criminal law investigation, charge 
and prosecution as incidental, rather than central to, that executive-mandated 
process.239 
Such characteristics overall are likely to produce a transformative shift in the 
balance between representative interests and executive interests in the Australian 
polity, facilitated by an expanding penumbra of secrecy over the questioning and 
detention powers.240 This concentration of executive power raises fundamental 
questions about the character and transformation of Australian democratic values, 
institutions and practices — supposedly the very matters being safeguarded, in part, 
by the questioning and detention powers against an international terrorism threat. 
The Australianisation process and its selective internationalism will itself generate 
the momentum and justification for further concentrations of executive power, 
doubtless through ongoing amendments to the legislation, prompted and justified by 
each successive major terrorist incident. 
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